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SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION 
 
The study entitled: “Implications of the use of cannabis in the South African workplace”, is a 
comparative study, situated within the labour law fraternity. This area of law regulates the 
“employer-employee relationship” which often comes into conflict. The author casts light on 
the conflicting interests of the employer to ensure safety in the workplace, against the 
employee’s right to privacy. On the one hand, employers’ have an overarching duty to enhance 
workplace safety by putting in place of drug testing policies. On the other spectrum, employees 
may challenge drug testing policies on the ground of the right to privacy. This conflict arose 
after the Constitutional Court legalised “private use” of cannabis in Prince. The concern is, 
inter alia, that urine drug test detects cannabis long after it has been consumed. It only discloses 
presence of drug metabolites and not the likelihood of impairment at the time of the test. 
Therefore, employees may be dismissed even though their actions took place in private and 
could in no way affect their ability to perform duties safely. In light that Prince legalised the 
private use of cannabis, the study questions whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction 
following a positive drug screening, where an employee had used cannabis privately at home. 
 
It is not clear how our courts should construe the LRA by weighing the conflicting interests of 
the employer (to ensure safety) and employees (privacy) to reach the balance required by “fair 
labour practices”. The case of Mthembu is subject to constitutional scrutiny for upsetting a 
“fair” balance, as the CCMA upheld dismissal as an appropriate sanction following a positive 
drug screening. Mthembu is a totally misleading judgment for ignoring that urinalysis has the 
disadvantage of showing past impairment. This policy is declared unjust by foreign courts. A 
comparative legal analysis is utilised to examine how the US, Canada and German courts assess 
reasonableness to ascertain which drug testing policies may be declared reasonable, and those 
which constitutes a prima facie unlawful invasion of privacy. Foreign courts argue that the 
limitation (testing policy) must rationally be capable of achieving its purpose (ensuring safety). 
Therefore, a testing method which detects current impairment is capable of achieving safety, 
as opposed to that which shows past impairment. The study argues that South African courts 
may seek guidance from foreign case law to positively influence our legal system, to maintain 
equilibrium between the conflicting interests of employer(s) and employee(s). This promotes 
the achievement of social justice in the workplace and a shift towards a transformative society. 
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1. Research statement 
 
This study constitutes a comparative legal analysis,2 situated within the labour law fraternity. 
Traditionally, the principles of labour law underlie the notion of “fairness” to balance the 
competing interests of employer(s) and employer(s). The issue derives from Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development v Prince (“Prince”) where Zondo ACJ used constitutional 
 
1  A quote by Bob Marley. 
2  See Chapter 3 § 4 below. 
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privacy as a gateway to legalise “private use” of cannabis. Thus, workplace drug testing creates 
a conflict between the interests of the employer (to enhance safety) and employees (privacy).3 
 
Constitutional privacy is afforded to everyone. This phrase is a testimony of the provision 
stating that the Bill of Rights binds everyone within the borders of the Republic.4 Although the 
Constitution does not define “privacy”, the judiciary has used its powers, to broadly define it 
as the “right to be left alone”.5 Our judiciary have often, by virtue of their powers, interpreted 
the right to privacy widely through protecting activities taking place “in private”.6 
 
The study is important because it ascertains when a drug testing policy may constitute a prima 
facie unlawful invasion of constitutional privacy. It also explores which drug testing policies 
may be regarded as “reasonable”. Considering that cannabis may be detected long after it has 
been consumed, the study conveys that urine drug test does not disclose accurate or current 
drug impairment, nor does it show if the degree of intoxication affects one’s ability to perform 
duties with the required capacity, care and skills. For example, a person who consumes 
cannabis on a Friday night, is most likely to show a positive drug test the following Monday.7 
 
3 According to Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince 2018 10 BCLR 1220 (CC) par 101 
the Court used its powers to interpret constitutional privacy widely. The Court held that privacy protects 
activities taking place in a private home. Therefore, Prince protects employee’s constitutional privacy to use 
cannabis at home. See also Mthembu / NCT Durban Wood Chips [2019] 28 CCMA 8.27.3 par 84 the CCMA, 
on the other hand, favoured the employer’s interests. It was held that urine drug test is justified where the 
nature of employment poses a high degree of danger. The Arbitrator indicated that the interests of the employer 
to ensure a safe workplace environment overrides the employee’s right to privacy. 
4  S 7(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter “the Constitution”) states that the 
Bill of Rights applies to all people in the Republic of South Africa. Refer to Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development [2004] ZACC 11 par 46 where Mokgoro J reiterated that the right to social security is afforded 
to everyone, including migrants. Although the Court dealt with socio-economic rights, the approach of Khosa 
is equally applicable to the right to privacy. 
5  See n 3 above. See also Bernstein v Bester [1996] ZACC 2 par 76; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice [1998] ZACC 15 par 116; Khumalo v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12 and Case v 
Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security [1996] ZACC 7 par 104. 
6  S 39(2) of the Constitution indicates that the judiciary (courts) vests the power to interpret provisions of the 
legislation. This section states that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation… every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. Van Staden Identification of the parties to the 
employment relationship: an appraisal to the teleological interpretation of statutes (2018 Thesis UP) 3 states 
that “…the judiciary can, through its power of interpretation, contribute to the transformation of society and 
the achievement of a social justice”. 
7  Jorge and Adams “https://www.labourguide.co.za/law-firms/cliffe-dekker-hofmeyr/2455-flying-high-weed-
in- the-workplace” (22-04-2017). See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 
613-18 (1989) where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that urine and blood tests are unreasonable 
searches in terms of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. The court reasoned that drug tests do not 
disclose current drug intoxication and the level of impairment. See Mthembu (n 3) par 45 during the arbitration, 
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What does all this imply to the right to privacy and workplace drug testing? Employees may 
be dismissed for being under the influence of drug substances during working hours. Section 
188(1)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act (hereinafter the “LRA”)8 and section 8 of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act (hereinafter “OHSA”),9 respectfully, prohibit the use, 
possession or being under the influence of drug substances in the workplace to enhance safety. 
 
On-site drug screening by way of urine samples is increasingly claiming the centre stage within 
the South African employment law and it is therefore subject to fierce debate.10 It has the 
disadvantage of detecting cannabis used in the past. Put another way, employees may be 
dismissed even though their actions took place in their own time and could in no way affect 
their ability to perform duties safely. A workplace that is characterised by a high degree of 
danger permits drug testing and dismissals on the ground of a positive drug test.11 The study 
questions the reasonableness of the urine testing policy and fairness of the dismissal thereof. 
 
The LRA requires dismissals of employees to be substantively fair.12 The Code of Good 
Practise provides requirements to determine the fairness of a dismissal including, inter alia, 
that the workplace rule or standard that has been contravened must be reasonable. Therefore, 
in the case at bar, policies regulating drug testing must be reasonable and rational.13 In a 
nutshell, this study determines if urinalysis drug test constitutes an invasion of constitutional 
privacy. If so, whether such invasion is reasonable and justifiable in an open, democratic 
society based on the founding values of human dignity, equality and freedom.14 
 
The study argues that our courts should construe the LRA in a way which searches for an 
appropriate balance of the conflicting interests of employer and employee. Employers duty to 
ensure safety with drug test programs, must be weighed with the employee’s right to privacy 
to reach a balance required by “fair labour practices” in section 23(1) of the Constitution. 
 
the employee testified that although the urine drug test is positive, he only used cannabis at home privately. 
The employee relied on the fact that urine testing does not disclose current drug impairment. 
8  66 of 1995. 
9  85 of 1993. 
10  Jorge and Tembe “https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/publications/2019/Employment/employm 
ent-alrt-8-april-keep-off-the-grass-dismissed-for-testing-positive-for-cannabis-at-work.html” (05-05-2019). 
11  See Mthembu (n 3) par 84. 
12  Section 185(a) of the LRA. 
13  Item 7, Schedule 8 of the LRA Code of Good Practise: Dismissals and Mthembu (n 3) par 64. 
14  See Chapter 5 for a discussion on what constitutes a reasonable drug testing policy. 
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2. Research questions and objectives 
 
The study contains the following research questions: 
 
(a) Do employee’s interests (protection of constitutional privacy) outweighs the 
employer’s interests (enhancing safety by putting in place of workplace drug testing 
policies)? 
(b) Does a positive drug screening of employees by way of urine samples constitutes a 
legitimate ground to hold disciplinary actions against employees? / is urine testing a 
reliable testing method to detect the likelihood of cannabis impairment at the time of 
the test? 
(c) Does on-site drug screening by way of urinalysis invade constitutional privacy? If so, 
is the invasion reasonable and justifiable in terms of the limitation clause, based on 
the founding values of freedom, human dignity and equality? 
 
The main objectives of this study are to consider the following: 
 
(a) The legislative and constitutional provisions regulating, inter alia, constitutional 
privacy protecting the private use of cannabis and provisions regulating workplace 
drug testing.  
(b) The South African case authority in relation to the crisis of on-site drug screening by 
way of urine samples. 
(c) A comparative legal analysis between the United States of America (hereinafter 
“US”), Canada and German case law within which urine testing is subject to scrutiny. 
It ascertains whether urine testing constitutes a prima facie unlawful invasion of 
privacy. 
(d) A discussion on how South African courts may seek guidance from the US, Canada 
and German case law to positively influence our legal system when faced with 
challenges of drug testing. 
(e) The recommendations and concluding remarks on the implementation of workplace 
drug testing policies that are reasonable and justifiable to balance the conflicting 
interests of the employer(s) and employee(s). 
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3. Methodology and limitations of the study 
 
A research methodology is a way in which a research is conducted. The study constitutes a 
comparative legal analysis.15 In the case at bar, comparative legal methodology is utilised to 
consider differences and similarities of foreign States. In doing so, the social, political and 
cultural similarities are considered to determine whether foreign legal principles are 
transplantable in our environment.16 In Case v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of 
Safety and Security (hereinafter “Curtis”), Mokgoro J warned that our courts may only rely on 
foreign law that is “comparable”.17 
 
The purposes of a comparative legal methodology are five-fold:18 
 
• academic discipline; 
• solutions for law reform and legislation; 
• a means of development; 
• a mechanism of understanding the law; and 
• a tool of harmonisation of the law and system unification.19 
 
 
15  According to Pieters “Functions of comparative law and practical methodology of comparing or how the goal 
determines the road!” https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/Functions%20of%20comparative%20 
law%29and%20practical%20methodology%20of%20comparing.pdf comparative legal methodology entails a 
comparison between the comparing State and foreign States. He Weifang “The Methodology of Comparative 
Study of Legal Cultures” 1994 Asian Pacific Law Review (APLR) 38 further states that comparative law 
compares legal systems of different States and see Chapter 4 for discussion on comparative legal methodology. 
16  For example, in South Africa, a medical certificate from a traditional healer (sangoma) is used for sick leave 
for purposes of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (hereinafter “BCEA”). Our society is 
characterised by diversity of cultures, traditions and beliefs. Refer to Kievites Kroon Country Estates v 
Mmoledi (2012) 33 ILJ 2812 (LAC) where the court stated that our pluralistic society is characterised by 
cultural diversity. It is of paramount importance to reasonably accommodate everyone. The court confirmed 
the validity of traditional healers’ certificates where employees’ treatment is “more holistic than the Western 
medicine”. On the other hand, the US labour statutes are not drafted or interpreted the same because there are 
no traditional healers in the US. This is an example of cultural difference to consider when applying a 
comparative legal methodology. See also Du Toit “Collective bargaining and worker participation” 2000 ILJ 
21. Steadman “Workplace forums in South Africa: A critical analysis” 2004 ILJ 25 and Summers “Workplace 
forums from a comparative perspective” 1995 ILJ 16 where the authors provides a comparative study between 
South Africa and Germany vis-à-vis workplace forums. 
17  [1996] ZACC 7 par 30. 
18  Van Nguyen Making Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Successful in Vietnam: A Need for a better 
Procurement legal mechanism (2017 Thesis UV) 24. 
19  Hepple “Harmonisation of labour law: Level playing field or minimum” 2009 De Jure 1 13. 
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In this study, comparative legal methodology is utilised to aid law reform and legislation. The 
ultimate purpose of a comparative legal analysis is seeking solutions from foreign jurisdictions. 
Pieters argues that “[o]ne of the most popular distant goals of law comparison is without any 
doubt finding de lege ferende solutions”. This helps the courts to closely scrutinize the 
challenges of one State’s legal system and taking lessons from a foreign legal system.20 
 
In casu, the study does not challenge Prince interpretation of constitutional privacy. The 
challenge is against urine drug testing policy upheld by the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter “the CCMA”), which in effect, infringes upon the 
employee’s constitutional privacy. It considers principles of foreign law for solutions to be 
adopted by employers, particularly, when attempting to implement drug testing policies that 
are reasonable. The study assesses reasonableness by weighing the interests of the employer to 
ensure safety with drug test policies, against the employee’s right to privacy, to reach the 
balance required by “fair labour practices” according to section 23(1) of the Constitution. 
 
The structure of the study is threefold. Part I provides a comprehensive introduction, the 
legislative and constitutional provisions of labour law within which the use of cannabis 
operates. Part II compares South Africa and foreign case authority on drug use during working 
hours. It ascertains whether drug screening by way of urine samples constitutes a prima facie 
unlawful invasion of the right to privacy. Part III provides recommendations and lessons to 
take from foreign law to positively influence the South African labour law. 
 
4. Literature review 
 
The study constitutes a literature review.21 The study refers to the relevant constitutional 
provisions, legislation, international instruments of labour law, judicial decisions, foreign case 
law, books, journal articles, reports, newspaper articles and views of academics. These sources 
 
20  See Pieters (n 15) 6 8 stating that “[l]aw comparison can provide very useful service to interpret national law. 
This is essentially so when foreign solutions have been taken over in the national legal order”. Whytock “Legal 
Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law” 2009 BYU Law Review 1879 states that scholars 
of comparative legal methodology should recognise legal systems of various countries as solutions to similar 
social problems. Momirov and Fourie “Vertical Comparative Law Methods: Tools for Conceptualising the 
International Rule of Law” 2009 Erasmus Law Review (ELR) 10 11 further points out that comparative law 
methodology requires one to consider legal system’s similar problems and solutions. 
21  Chapter 2 “Review of Literature & Research Methodology” 21 states that the importance of literature review 
is to relate findings with previous sources. This paves a way to conduct further research. 
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of reference, as appears below, ascertain whether on-site drug screening by way of urinalysis 
constitute a prima facie unlawful invasion of the right to privacy. 
 
5. Outline 
 
5.1 Part A: General 
 
5.1.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly introduce the study through the research statement within which the 
problems of on-site drug screening are brought into sharp focus. It will list the research 
questions and objectives. The methodology and limitations of the study are discussed under the 
same sub-heading. Lastly, the chapter reflects on the literature review of the study. 
 
5.1.2 Chapter 2: Legislative and constitutional framework 
 
The intersection between constitutional law and labour law within which the use of cannabis 
operates is prevalent in this chapter. However, the legislative provisions are discussed firstly 
by virtue of the subsidiarity principle which obliges our courts to firstly rely on national 
legislation [enacted by parliament] before relying directly on the constitutional provisions. This 
chapter also focuses on international instruments pertaining to workplace drug testing. 
 
5.2 Part B: Drug testing policies in the workplace: A comparative analysis 
 
5.2.1 Chapter 3: South African case authority 
 
In this chapter, on-site drug screening by way of urine samples is subject to scrutiny. The South 
Africa case law highlights the disadvantage of urinalysis which detects cannabis used in the 
past. Put differently, employees may be dismissed even though their actions took place in 
private and could in no way affect their ability to perform duties safely. This chapter critically 
discusses this issue in line with legislative and constitutional provisions. 
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5.2.2 Chapter 4: Comparative analysis: US, Canada and German case authority 
 
This chapter provides an overlap between US, Canada, German and Australian courts approach 
vis-à-vis workplace drug testing. Much of this chapter argues that there must be a “rational 
relationship” between the limitation (drug testing policy) and its purpose (ensuring safety). Put 
another way, employers may use drug testing systems that detects current impairment to 
promote the purpose of maintaining safety, as opposed to those that detects past impairment. 
 
5.3 Part C: Findings and recommendations 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses how South African courts may seek guidance from foreign case law to 
positively influence our legal system, to assist South African labour courts in finding a 
yardstick to resolve challenges of on-site drug screening as addressed in the previous chapters. 
It provides concluding remarks on workplace drug testing and a way forward. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Legislative and constitutional framework 
 
“[T]he right to privacy embraces the right to be free from intrusion and interference by the 
State and others in one’s personal life.”22 
 
 
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..... 10 
2. Legislative framework………………………………………………….……………… 10 
3. Constitutional framework................................................................................................17 
    3.1 Overview…………………………………………………………………………... 17 
    3.2 The scope of the right to privacy…………………………………………………... 20 
    3.3 International instruments…………………………………………………………... 23 
    3.4 Balancing of competing interests of employer and employee…………………….. 25 
4. Conclusion….................................................................................................................. .27 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the legislative and constitutional context within which the use of 
cannabis operates. Firstly, it dwells on the provisions of the legislation. Thereafter, this is 
followed by the constitutional and international law provisions vis-à-vis challenges pertaining 
to workplace drug testing. The “subsidiarity principle” requires our courts to firstly challenge 
national legislation before relying directly on the Constitution.23 
 
2. Legislative framework 
 
The Constitution is the point of departure as the supreme law of the Republic.24 Labour related 
matters are regulated by section 23, contained in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution). The scope of section 23 is wide enough to protect interests of the employer and 
employee. Subsection (1) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to fair labour practices”. The 
word “everyone” is a clear indication of the inclusive and wide coverage.25 
 
22  Commentary by McQuoid-Mason The Constitutional Law (2018) 1. 
23  See n 38 below for a discussion of the “subsidiarity principle”. 
24  S 2 of the Constitution states that “[t]his Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”. 
25  Refer to s 23(1) of the Constitution. See also Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work (2016) 39-40 and n 26 below. 
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The scope of section 23 binds both employers and employees.26 Currie and De Waal argues 
further that the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons. This denotes that section 23 is 
applied horizontally.27 In turn, the State has a duty to protect, respect, promote and fulfil the 
constitutional right in section 23. Put differently, the right to fair labour practices applies 
vertically to the State. The South African Bill of Rights applies vertically and horizontally.28 
 
Section 23 is not a stand-alone right, undoubtedly, the purposive interpretation in the sense of 
its wording thereof is generous of other rights.29 Ideally, this means that section 23 is not 
absolute. It is read, collectively, with other fundamental rights. Chief amongst them include 
sections 10 (human dignity), 9 (equality clause), 11 (life), 12 (freedom and security), 32 (access 
to information) and the protection of section 14 (privacy) in the workplace (for own 
emphasis).30 The right to fair labour practices is given effect to by legislative provisions 
including, inter alia, the LRA, OHSA and Employment Equity Act (hereinafter “EEA”).31 
 
26  In NEHAWU v University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) par 36, at issue was whether the word 
“everyone” in s 23(1) of the Constitution refers to both employers and employees. The appellant, however, 
challenged the constitutionality of s 186(2) of the LRA, which only affords protection of fair labour practices 
to employees and excludes employers. The argument was that s 186(2) is not in line with the word “everyone” 
in s 23(1) and that it should be declared unconstitutional. Ngcobo J held that s 186(2) is not unconstitutional. 
The reason for the judgement is drawn from Kahn-Freund’s conception. Labour law scholars often refer to 
Kahn-Freund famous passage which states that labour law seeks to balance the unequal bargaining power 
between employers and employees. This owes to the fact that employers rely on contractual remedies and have 
a stronger bargaining power than employees. The LRA seeks to promote social justice in the workplace by 
affording employees protection to balance the unequal bargaining power. See n 128 below. 
27  S 8(3) of the Constitution states that “[w]hen applying… the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person… a 
court must… give effect to a right in the Bill…”. Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 31-68 
refers to the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. This means, inter alia, the Bill of Rights binds natural 
and juristic persons. In turn, the courts must give effect to the fundamental rights. Van Niekerk and Smit (n 
25) 37-38 discusses the provision of s 8(3) of the Constitution. Van Niekerk states that natural and juristic 
persons are bound by the Bill of Right “to the extent that a right is applicable, taking into account the nature 
of the right and any duty imposed by the right”. Cooper Constitutional Law (2018) 5 stated that s 23(1) applies 
to all employers irrespective of whether they are juristic persons or not. 
28  S 7(2) of the Constitution and Currie and De Waal (n 27) 31-68 states that vertical application means that the 
Bill of Rights binds the State. Put differently, the State must respect the fundamental rights unless the 
infringement is justifiable in terms of the limitation clause (s 36). 
29  See Henrico “Understanding the concept of “religion” within the constitutional guarantee of religious 
freedom” 2015 SALJ 785 786. 
30  See Khumalo v Holomisa (n 5) par 27, where O’Regan J asserts that our constitutional order acknowledged 
that there is a close link between privacy and dignity. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) par 34, where Ackermann J mentions that the right to privacy 
is interrelated and interdependent to other fundamental rights in the Constitution. See further Deokiram When 
does the non-recognition of religious holidays constitute unfair discrimination in the South African 
workplace? (2017 dissertation UJ) 16-17. 
31 See n 37 below. 
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Labour law legislative provisions must be interpreted in conformity with the interpretative 
approach adopted in Carmichael v Minister of Safety and Security, where Ackermann J and 
Goldstone J referred to section 39(2) of the Constitution which requires that “[w]hen 
interpreting any legislation… every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights”.32 This section is a testimony of the “indirect application” of 
the Bill of Rights mentioned by Currie and De Waal. This requires that “all rules, principles or 
norms be subjected to and construed in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights”. Therefore, labour legislation must be applied, interpreted or developed in conformity 
with the “objective normative values” of the Bill of Rights.33  
 
The aim of the LRA is to achieve labour peace, social justice, economic development and 
democratisation of the workplace. In doing so, the LRA gives effect to the provisions of section 
23 of the Constitution and obligations of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).34 Section 
3(b) states that interpretation of the LRA must be consistent with the Constitution. The LRA is 
also interpreted in line with the international law obligations,35 as the ILO Fact-finding and 
Conciliation Commission influenced the drafting of the 1995 LRA.36 Sections 1 and 3 indicates 
that the LRA gives effect to the Constitution and labour international standards.37 
 
National legislation is enacted by the parliament to give effect to the Constitution. According 
to the subsidiarity principle, it is impermissible to bypass national legislation and rely directly 
on the Constitution.38 This dictum is quoted by various law scholars, including the famous 
 
32  S 39(2) of the Constitution and refer to Carmichael v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] ZACC 22. 
33  Currie and De Waal (n 27) 31. Refer to Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5 par 29. Gondwe (n 83) below. 
Bato Star (n 38) par 91 Ngcobo J stated that “…all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill 
of Rights”. In Investigating Directorate (n 90) par 21 Langa DP reiterates that the Constitution guides the way 
in which legislation is interpreted according to s 39(2) of the Constitution. 
34  S 1(a) of the LRA. 
35  Above. 
36  See Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 22 and see further Saley and Benjamin “The Context of the ILO Fact-finding 
and Conciliation Commission Report on South Africa” 1992 ILJ 731 discussing that the ILO Fact-finding and 
Conciliation Commission played an important role in the drafting of the 1995 LRA. In 1992, the Commission 
filed a report providing recommendations that the 1995 LRA be in conformity with ILO standards. This was 
in response to a complaint from COSATU in relation to the amendment of the 1956 Act. It is trite that the ILO 
became an important source of reference when the 1995 LRA was drafted. 
37  Refer to s 1 and 3 of the LRA. See s 3 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 which also states that the 
interpretation of the Act must comply with the Constitution and the obligations of international law (such as 
the ILO Conventions). 
38  Van Niekerk and Smit (25) 38. See SANDU (n 40) below. Refer to Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
(2007) 12 BLLR 1097 par 248 Nqcobo J formulated the subsidiarity principle in SANDU in the context of s 
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passage in the case of SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence (hereinafter 
“SANDU”),39 where O’Regan J pointed out that: 
 
“[T]here legislation is enacted [by parliament] to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not 
bypass that legislation and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging that legislation… .”
40
 
 
The starting point is the legislation. A litigant may seek a remedy based on section 185(a) of 
the LRA when challenging an unfair dismissal before relying on section 23, as read with 
sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 32 and 14 of the Constitution. This accords with the subsidiarity principle 
 
23(5) of the Constitution. Ngcobo J indicated that where there is a constitutional challenge based on s 23(5), 
the Court had to rely on s 145 of the LRA instead of s 23(5) of the Constitution. Further refer to Minister of 
Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) par 437 Ngcobo J relied on the 
subsidiarity principle as set out in SANDU. Nqcobo J asserts that legislation enacted by Parliament must not 
be ignored in any case whatsoever. Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs [2004] ZACC 15 
par 25 was the first case on the subsidiarity principle. O’Regan J stated that a litigant is prohibited from relying 
on the common law or legislation to protect a constitutional right against infringement. See Chirwa v Transnet 
Limited (2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC) par 123 Ngcobo J quoted SANDU when relying on s 157(2) of the LRA before 
directly on s 23(1) of the Constitution. Economic Freedom Fighters v The Speaker of the National Assembly 
[2016] ZACC 11 par 81-84 Mogoeng CJ held that the Applicant’s direct reliance on s 182(1)(c) of the 
Constitution before relying on Public Protector Act is misconceived. Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co 
SA Ltd 2007 28 ILJ 789 par 26 the court held that a litigant may attempt to develop the common law to the 
extent of the deficiency of the Act. My Vote Counts NCP v Speaker of the National Assembly [2015] ZACC 
31 par 53. Murcott and Van der Westhuizen “The Ebb and Flow of the Application of the Principle of 
Subsidiarity – Critical Reflections on Motau and My Vote Counts” 2015 CCR 47 48 stated that “[t]he 
subsidiarity principle… requires a litigant to rely on national legislation when enforcing a constitutional right 
rather than circumventing the legislation in favour of direct application of a constitutional provision…”. 
Murcott and Van der Westhuizen discussed the subsidiarity principle in relation to the judgment of My Vote 
Counts. Bosch “Bent Out of Shap? Critically Assessing the Right to Fair Labour Practices in Developing South 
African Labour Law” 2008 Stell LR 375 379. See also s 23(5) of the Constitution stating that “[n]ational 
legislation may be enacted … [t]o the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter” and s 9(2) 
further provides that legislative measures may be taken to promote the achievement of equality. 
39  n 2 above par 437. See also Du Toit “Protection against Unfair Discrimination in the Workplace: Are the 
Courts Getting is Right?” 2007 LDD 1. Henrico (n 29) 788 789. In NAPTOSA (n 41) below Conradie J also 
mentions that there are exceptional instances where a litigant may rely directly on constitutional remedies. 
Bosch (n 38) 375 379 provided a commentary on NEPTOSA and further stated that a litigant may bypass 
national legislation and rely directly on the Constitution where there is no “appropriate relief”. In this case, 
the employer relied directly on s 23(1) of the Constitution. Simelela v Member of the Executive Council for 
Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 22 ILJ 1688 (LC) par 18 Francis AF stated that “[a]lthough the 
unfair transfer of an employee is not catered for expressly in the LRA, an employee is not precluded from 
relying directly on the Constitution to enforce his or her right not to be subjected to unfair labour practices” 
and see National Entitled Workers Union v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration 2003 24 
ILJ 2335 par 8 Landman J also supports that should an employer attempt to challenge against unfair labour 
practices which is not regulated in the legislation, a litigant may rely on s 23 of the Constitution. The approach 
of NAPTOSA is rectified in SANDU as appears above. The court held that a litigant must firstly challenge the 
deficiency of the legislation. 
40  (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) par 51. 
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set out in New Clicks and SANDU.41 Section 185(a) of the LRA prohibits unfair dismissals 
where an employee is found under the influence of cannabis during working hours. 
 
Section 185(a) reads: 
 
“Every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.”
42
 
 
When proving the fairness of a dismissal, item 7, Schedule 8 of the LRA Code of Good Practise 
on Dismissals (hereinafter “the Code”) requires the employer to consider: 
 
“(a) Whether the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating conduct in, or of relevance to the  
 workplace; and 
  (b) If a rule or standard was contravened, whether - 
(i) the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard; 
(ii) … .”
43
 
 
The workplace rule must be valid or reasonable. A rule that is unlawful may render the 
dismissal to be substantively unfair.44 This, however, is decided on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, stricter rules against theft are adopted by employees in retail trade. In casu, stricter 
rules of drug testing are justified where the nature of employment is safety sensible.45 In the 
Arbitration of the CCMA, the Arbitrator relied on the requirement of reasonableness in item 
7(b)(i) of the Code. The Arbitrator indicated that urine drug testing is a reasonable policy 
because the nature of employment posed a high degree of danger.46 Although, from the face of 
the arbitration award, the CCMA did not explain how reasonableness is assessed. 
 
The LRA prohibits the use, possession or being under the influence of cannabis or any drug 
related substance in the workplace. The employer may put in place a policy prohibiting the use 
 
41  Deokiram (n 30) 6-7. 2006 1 BCLR 1 (CC) par 437 and NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape 
2001 2 SA 112 (CC) par 7. A litigant must firstly seek a remedy based on legislation and may not directly seek 
constitutional remedies because such is rendered impermissible. 
42  66 of 1995. 
43  66 of 1995 and Mthembu (n 3) par 64. 
44  Above. 
45  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 281-282 and in Mthembu (n 3) par 83 the Arbitrator applied much stricter drug 
testing policies because the nature of employment posed a higher degree of danger. Employees worked with 
dangerous machines, vehicles and conveyed large logs weighing up to 100 kg. 
46  Above and refer to Rustenburg Platinum Mines v CCMA 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA) par 18. 
 15 
 
of cannabis.47 In breaching the policy thereof, the employer may institute disciplinary action 
which may subsequently result in a dismissal on the ground of misconduct. Section 188(a)(i) 
of the LRA list misconduct as a ground for fair reason of a dismissal.48 
 
Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA gives effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution in protecting 
employees against unfair labour practices relating to promotions. Employees who apply for 
employment promotions, may be required to submit blood or urine samples for drug screening. 
Some workplaces adopt this drug testing policy. Employment promotion is only granted on a 
condition of a negative drug test.49 This decision is determined based on “fairness”.50 
 
Van Niekerk stated that the employer must justify its reason for not promoting the employee.51 
In NEHAWU v University of Cape Town, Ngcobo J asserts that “fairness” element of the right 
to fair labour practice, must be assessed through “balancing of competing interests”.52 This 
means the employee’s individual privacy should be weighed with the interest of the employer 
to intrude privacy thereof.53 However, as Van Niekerk argued, it is not clear how the courts 
should construe the LRA through balancing of competing interests.54 
 
Pre-employment drug testing requires job applicants to undergo drug screening. Meaning that 
applicants are only offered employment on a condition of a negative drug test.55 Unlike in the 
LRA, the definition of “employee” is limited to job applicants and not persons seeking 
promotions.56 This matter is regulated in terms of section 6 of the EEA prohibiting a 
discriminatory workplace policy or practise against employees, where the discrimination 
 
47  See Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 276. 
48  66 of 1995. 
49  Above. 
50  See Van Niekerk. 
51  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 181-182. In Cullen and Distell (2001) 10 CCMA 6.9.3 the CCMA stated that the 
Arbitrators’ function is ensuring that employers act fairly towards employees, when selecting employees for 
promotions. SAPS v Safety & Security Bargaining Council (2010) 31 ILJ 2711 (LC) par 15 Basson J stated 
that the decision to promote is solely within the employer’s discretion. In the words of Basson J, such decision 
“falls within the managerial prerogative of the employer”. The Court or Arbitrator may only interfere with 
such decision, where there is a gross unreasonableness or where there exists a serious flaw regarding the 
decision to promote. 
52  NEHAWU (n 26) par 40. 
53  Above. 
54  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 43-44. 
55  Wilner v. Thomburgh 928 F.2d (D.C. Cir 1991). 
56  S 9 of the EEA states that the term “employee” refers to applicants for employment according to s 6 of the 
EEA. 
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thereof is unfair based on one or more listed grounds or “on any other arbitrary ground”.57 An 
employee who is not offered employment on the ground of a positive pre-employment testing 
qualifies for section 6 of the EEA protection, especially, where the drug policy is unreasonable. 
 
LRA protects the interests of employees against unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices. 
On the other hand, employers are not prohibited to put in place of workplace drug testing 
policies. An employee may be tested for cannabis in the workplace based on the EEA. Section 
7 of the EEA permits medical testing in the workplace, but only to the extent that it is justifiable.  
 
Section 7 reads that: 
 
 
“(a) Medical testing of an employee is permissible only when legislation requires testing or when this is 
justifiable for various reasons. 
 (b) Medical testing is justified when considering medical facts, employment conditions, social policy, 
the fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent requirement of the job.”
58
 
 
Section 8 of the EEA further provides as follows: 
 
“Psychometric testing and other similar assessments of an employee are prohibited unless the test or 
assessment being used has been scientifically shown to be valid and reliable, can be applied fairly to all 
employees, is not biased against any employee; and has been certified by the Health Professions Council 
of South Africa (HPCSA) established under the Health Professions Act, 56 of 1974 or any other body 
which may be authorized by law to certify such tests or assessments.”
59
 
 
Employers have an onerous obligation to ensure safety in the workplace.60 Section 8 OHSA 
provides that “[e]very employer shall provide and maintain, as far as is reasonably practicable, 
a working environment that is safe and without risk to the health of employees”.61 Another 
provision is the General Safety Regulation (“GSR”) 2A(1) of the OHSA which prohibits 
employees who are under the influence or possessing cannabis, to enter the premises of the 
employment. The employer may not permit such person to remain in the premises of 
employment. This provision states that “[s]ubject to the provisions of sub-regulation (3), no 
 
57  S 6(1) of the EEA states that “[n]o person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an 
employee, in any employment policy or practise, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status… or on any other arbitrary ground”. 
58  66 of 1998. 
59  S 1(a) of the Constitution. 
60  City of Johannesburg v A.H Swanepoel NO (2016) 37 ILJ 1400 (LC) par 11. 
61  58 of 1993. 
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person at a workplace shall be under the influence of or have in his or her possession or partake 
of or offer any other person intoxicating liquor or drugs”.62 
 
3. Constitutional framework 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
South African Bill of Rights protects the rights of all persons in the Republic. Our fundamental 
rights underlie the founding values of human dignity, freedom and equality, as put forward in 
section 7(1) of the Constitution.63 Another important constitutional value is the concept of 
ubuntu which forms part of our cultural heritage.64 Although the 1996 Constitution makes no 
reference of ubuntu, O’Regan J indicated that our courts recognise ubuntu as an important 
constitutional value in S v Makwanyane.65 
 
Oliver and Kalula argues that the courts, tribunals and forums are obliged to consider the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality, freedom and the concept of ubuntu when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.66 This contention is in line with section 39(1)(a) of the 
Constitution.67 
 
 
62  n 61 above and see item 7.3 of the Code of Good Practice on HIV and AIDS and World of Work stating that 
“[a]ll persons, including those with HIV and AIDS have the legal right to privacy. A worker is therefore not 
legally required to disclose his or her HIV status or related medical information to his or her employer or to 
other workers”. 
63  The Constitution. 
64  Kievites Kroon Country Estates v Mmoledi (2012) 33 ILJ 2812 par 26 Tlaletsi JA stated that “…ubuntu is part 
of our heritage as a society” and Himonga, Taylor and Pope (n 65) 397 canvassed the judgment of Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers where Sachs J stated that “[t]he spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep 
cultural heritage of the majority of the population, suffuses the whole constitutional order”. 
65  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 224 Langa J stated that ubuntu “recognises a person’s status as a 
human being”. Oliver and Kalula Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 62 confirm that ubuntu is still 
recognised as a constitutional value. Rautenbach-Malherbe (n 90 (2012)) 10 pointed out that the concept of 
ubuntu underlies our Constitution. See further Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 
7 par 37 and Himonga, Taylor and Pope “Reflections on Judicial Views of Ubuntu” 2013 PERJ 67. The 1993 
Interim Constitution expressly mentions ubuntu as a constitutional value. Although it is no longer formally 
written in the Final Constitution, ubuntu is still an important constitutional value, more so when it is widely 
interpreted by courts. 
66  Oliver and Kalula (n 65) 59-60. 
67  S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution states that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, any court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”. 
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Economic development and social justice are the main aims of the Constitution. In labour law 
context, the achievement of social justice in the workplace is of paramount importance.68 As 
appears above, this aim is contained both in the LRA and EEA, respectfully, thereby giving 
effect to the Preamble of the Constitution.69 
 
The following passage appears in the Preamble: 
 
“We therefore… adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to [h]eal the divisions 
of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights.”
70
 
 
The right to fair labour practices is not read in isolation. It is captured in the observation of 
“equality”, “human dignity”, “life” and “privacy”.71 It goes without saying that fundamental 
rights are interdependent and interrelated to each other. This school of thought is referred to as 
the “indivisibility of rights”.72 In the words of Ackermann J in National Coalition, dignity and 
privacy cannot be read in isolation.73 The same goes for equality and privacy.74 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution reads: 
 
“(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has equal protection and benefit of the law. 
 
68  Benjamin and see Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 9-10. 
69  n 34 refers to the objects of the LRA and EEA. 
70  Preamble of the Constitution. 
71  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 37 pointed out that s 23 of the Constitution is not the only provision in the Bill 
of Rights that influence labour law. 
72  Ramcharan Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Cases and Materials (2005) 1. 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19 par 23 Yacoob J asserts that “[a]ll 
the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually supporting”. See Anthony The Human Rights 
Principle of Indivisibility and its Ideological Significance in the Contemporary Age (UNSW Thesis 2018) 10.  
73  National Coalition (n 5) par 30-97. 
74  Par 31 Ackermann J read equality, human dignity and equality collectively. Oliver and Kalula (n 65) 62 states 
that there is a correlation between the right to human dignity and the protection of the right to equality. 
Rautenbach (n 87 (2012)) 334 noted that human dignity is a precondition for the realisation of other rights. 
Human dignity plays a pivotal role because it is often read through the prism of other rights. Rautenbach argues 
that human dignity still operates as a separate right. In Khumalo v Holomisa (n 5) par 27 O’Regan J held that 
human dignity is foundational to the right to privacy. See Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 37-54 defined dignity 
as the “intrinsic human worth of all people”. This is also quoted in Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha; Sibi v 
Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the RSA 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) par 48; Thomas v Minister 
of Home Affaires 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC) par 35; see further Larbi-Odam v Member of the Executive Council 
for Education (North-west Province) and the Minister of Education 1997 12 BCLR 1655 (CC) par 16-20; 
Walters v Transitional Local Council of Port Elizabeth 2001 1 BLLR 98 (LC) par 28 and Hoffmann v SA 
Airways 2000 21 ILJ 2357 (CC) par 44. 
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 (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the   
 achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more of the 
grounds in terms of subsection (3) National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair.”
75
 
 
Section 10 of the Constitution states that: 
 
“[E]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”
76
 
 
The broad notion of “everyone” in section 23(1) of the Constitution also protects interests of 
employer(s).77 Workplace environment that pose a higher degree of danger impose an 
overarching duty on the employer to ensure safety. Considering section 24 of the Constitution, 
employee(s) have a constitutional right to workplace “environment that is not harmful to their 
health and wellbeing”.78 Section 8 of the OHSA (health and safety in the workplace), gives 
effect to section 23 read with section 24 of the Constitution.79 
 
The Constitutional Court repeatedly states that the right to life in section 11 of the Constitution 
is of pivotal importance and therefore goes to the bedrock of our constitutional framework.80 
There is a close connection between the right to life and the right to workplace environment 
that is not harmful. Where safety of the public or co-employees is endangered, this will have a 
direct impact on life.81 
 
75  The Constitution. 
76  Above. 
77  NEHAWU (n 26) par 16. 
78  S 24 of the Constitution. 
79  85 of 1993. 
80  S 11 of the Constitution and McQuoid-Mason (n 22) 451 points out the right to life is the most fundamental 
right in the Bill of Rights. 
81  Van der Linde and Basson commentary Constitutional Law (2018) 44 points out that the right to life and the 
right to a healthy environment are related. Refer to Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) I.C.J 
Reports 1997 par 112 where Weeramantry J held “[t]he protection of the environment is likewise a vital part 
of contemporary human rights doctrine for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to 
health and the right to life itself…”. Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General 
Environmental [2007] ZACC 31 at 201 Ngcobo J stated that a healthy environment is pivotal to life. In 
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3.2 The scope of the right to privacy 
 
Section 14 of the Final Constitution provides that: 
 
“(1) Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have— 
 (a) their person or home searched; 
 (b) their property searched; 
 (c) their possessions seized; or 
 (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.”82 
 
The case of Bernstein v Bester (hereinafter “Bernstein”) is the locus classicus within the 
jurisprudence of privacy.83 It goes without saying that privacy is not clearly defined in the 
Constitution. The absence of a clear definition paves a way for the judiciary to attach meaning 
and broaden the scope of privacy.84 
 
 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health Kwazulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) par 13 Chaskalson J stated that the 
right to access emergency medical treatment in s 27(3) is closely linked with life and Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign [2002] ZACC 15  par 28 the Court stated that the right to have access to health 
care services in s 27(1) should be construed in light with the right to life in s 11 of the Constitution. In S v 
Makwanyane (n 65) par 326 O’Regan J stated obiter that “[t]he right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all 
other rights in the Constitution. Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be possible to exercise 
rights or be the bearer of them. The right to life is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood, 
incorporates the right to dignity. So, the right to dignity and to life are intertwined. The right to life is more 
than exercise, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity; without dignity, human life is 
substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity”. In Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: 
In Re S v Walters 2002 7 BCLR 663 par 33 Kriegler J stated that the right to life is only limited where persons 
use force to protect themselves or in self-defence. Kriegler J stated that such limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable. These provisions are sources of reference to justify safety in the workplace. An overarching duty 
on the employer to ensure a safe workplace environment derives from the constitutional right to an 
environment that is not harmful. S 8 of the OHSA gives effect to s 24 read with s 11 of the Constitution. 
82  The Constitution. 
83  Gondwe The Protection of Privacy in the Workplace: A Comparative Study (Thesis US 2011) 62 and Currie 
and De Waal (n 27) 297 mentioned that although Bernstein was decided under the Interim Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court interpretation of privacy provides a comprehensive and rich precedent for the 
jurisprudence of privacy. 
84  See Klaasen (n 169) 5 below states that “… a court still has to give meaning and substance to the constitutional 
rights and values even though the meaning thereof is often unclear. This requires of the judges to make a value 
judgment to give effect and meaning to constitutional rights and values”. Kylie v Conciliation Commission 
Mediation and Arbitration (2010) 31 ILJ 1600 (LAC) par 44-54 provides an example of how Davis AJ added 
substance and meaning to the constitutional right to fair labour practices in the Labour Appeal Court 
(hereinafter “LAC”). The appellant was a sex-worker at a massage parlor and challenged the fairness of the 
dismissal. The Labour Court (hereinafter “LC”) refused to hear the matter because the appellant’s nature of 
work was unlawful. Davis JA, however, used human dignity as a gateway to afford sex workers protection of 
the right to fair labour practices in s 23(1) of the Constitution. The LAC used its powers to broadly interpret s 
23 by giving it meaning and substance to extend the scope of protection to sex-workers. In Grootboom (n 72) 
Yacoob J attached meaning to the right to have access of adequate housing in s 26 of the Constitution. 
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History bears testimony of the absence of a clear definition of privacy. In Bernstein, 
Ackermann J described privacy as an “amorphous and elusive” concept, which is subject to 
academic debate.85  The Court has often defined it as “the right to be left alone”.86 Rautenbach-
Malherbe has gone further to define it as “the right to live your life as it pleases”.87 
 
In the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
(hereinafter “National Coalition”), Ackermann J describes the right to privacy as “an inner 
sanctum of a person”, which is shielded from outside interference. The Court states that privacy 
is not absolute and that it should not be construed individualistically. Ackermann J referred to 
an important remark in Bernstein. 
 
The following passage appears in Bernstein: 
 
“[N]o right is to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset of interpretation each right is always 
already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy this would mean 
that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home 
environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that 
community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby 
shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. 
Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and 
activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.”
88
 
 
Although Ackermann J establishes privacy based on the existence of “inner sanctum” and 
“truly personal realm”.89 In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (hereinafter “Investigating Directorate”), Langa DP argues that people still 
retain privacy when outside of inner sanctum and truly personal realm. This means personal 
belongings such as cars, offices and mobile cell phones qualify for the right to be left alone.90 
 
In National Coalition, Ackermann J stated obiter that: 
 
“Privacy recognizes that we all have the right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy which allows 
us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside community.”
91
 
 
85  Bernstein (n 5) par 65 and McQuoid-Mason (n 22) 2. 
86  See n 5 above. 
87  Rautenbach-Malherbe Constitutional Law (2012) 357 and NM v Smith 2007 7 BCLR 751 (CC) par 32. 
88  Bernstein (n 5) par 67. 
89  Above. 
90  2000 10 BCLR 1079 (CC) par 16. 
91  National Coalition (n 5) par 32. 
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Sachs J concurred: 
 
“[T]his right to be left alone is not merely “a negative right to occupy a space free from government 
intrusion” but is also a right to get on with your life, express your personality and make fundamental 
decisions about your intimate relationships without penalisation.”
92
 
 
To determine whether a conduct or policy constitutes an unlawful infringement of privacy. The 
common-law adopted a single based inquiry. Whereas the constitutional privacy adopts a dual 
based enquiry.93 The former requires our courts to determine whether there is an unlawful 
infringement of common-law invasion of privacy.94 The latter inquiry was coined in Bernstein. 
 
Ackermann J states that the following questions need to be answered in the case of 
constitutional invasion of privacy: 
 
“(a) Whether law or conduct infringed constitutional privacy, and if so; 
  (b) it is determined whether the infringement is justifiable and reasonableness in terms of the limitation 
  clause.”
95
 
 
Bernstein provides that to establish the first inquiry (infringement of the constitutional right to 
privacy), there must be a “legitimate subjective expectation of privacy”, which must be 
“objectively a legitimate expectation”, that the society regards as reasonable.96 Therefore, 
privacy is what can be reasonably considered to be private. In Investigating Directorate, Langa 
DP stated obiter, that South African courts follow the approach adopted in US, Canada and 
Germany.97 Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive discussion on foreign law perspective.98 
 
To determine the second inquiry (justifiability of the infringement), the courts must weigh 
between the competing interests of the individual’s right to privacy and the governmental 
interest to intrude privacy. This entails a balancing of the competing rights established based 
 
92  Above. 
93  McQuoid-Mason (n 22) 21. 
94  Above. 
95  See Bernstein (n 5) above. 
96  McQuoid-Mason (n 22) 22 and Investing Directorate (n 90) par 16. 
97  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25). Bernstein (n 5) par 75 and Investing Directorate (n 90) par 76-78 the Court 
highlighted similarities of the jurisprudence of privacy between South Africa, US, Canada and Germany. The 
South African courts adopts the subjective and objective expectation of privacy adopted in foreign States. 
98  See Chapter 3 § 4. 
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on “reasonableness”.99 The courts must balance expectation of privacy against the rights of the 
community. McQuoid stated that “inner sanctum” is an exception to this.100 Bernstein defines 
inner sanctum as a person’s sexual preferences, family life and home environment.101 
 
The crux of the matter is that Bernstein is silent on how “reasonableness” should be measured. 
This means there is still no clear understanding on what constitutes privacy. This issue has been 
subject of academic debate.102 Currie and De Waal argues that Bernstein does not provide a 
comprehensive explanation of “reasonableness”. Therefore, there is ambiguity on what may 
reasonably be regarded as private.103 Rautenbach-Malherbe supports this argument by stating 
that Bernstein does not explain what “privacy” is.104 Currie and De Waal argues that Bernstein 
only dwelled on the fact that “reasonableness” should only be seen based on “inner sanctum” 
and “truly personal realm”. Thus, Bernstein approach is vague and ambiguous. It does not 
clearly define “reasonableness” within the jurisprudence of privacy.105 
 
In labour law context, the courts are silent on how to balance the interests of employer and 
employee based on reasonableness. As stated above, Van Niekerk argues that it is not clear 
how courts should construe the LRA in a way that weighs the competing interests between 
employer and employee.106  
 
3.3 International law instruments 
 
South African labour law is afforded international law status. The verb “must” in section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution imposes an obligation upon the courts to rely on international law. 
Section 39(1)(b) is read with sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution. When read collectively, 
these sections provide a gateway for our courts to rely on international law instruments.107 
 
99  S 36 of the Constitution. Holomisa v Argus 1996 2 SA 588 (W) par 606 provides an example where the court 
balanced the conflicting interests. Nugent JA weighed freedom of speech against reputation. 
100  McQuoid (n 22) 22. 
101  Bernstein (n 5) par 69. 
102  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 44. 
103  Currie and De Waal (n 27) 297-298. 
104  Rautenbach-Malherbe (n 87 (2012)) 358. 
105  See n 103 above. 
106  NEHAWU (n 26) par 16 and Van Niekerk (n 25) 43-44. 
107  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 29-31 stated that our Constitution affords international law status. Refer to s 232 
of the Constitution stating that “[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent 
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Section 39(1)(b) reads as follows: 
 
“When interpreting the Bill of Rights… the courts, tribunal or forum must consider international law.”
108
 
 
In the process of interpreting legislation, the Constitution requires courts to apply public 
international law.109 Van Niekerk states that the “…constitutional dispensation recognises 
international law as a foundation of democracy”.110 Sections 3(c) of the LRA and 3(c) of the 
EEA provides that the interpretation of the Act must comply with international law 
obligations.111 In the words of Oliver and Kalula, the South African Constitution is 
international law-friendly, and considers both binding and non-binding public international 
law.112 In labour law context, ILO Conventions and recommendations are the  main sources. 
 
In the arbitration award issued by the CCMA in Nkhape / Department of Rural Development 
& Agrarian Reform, the Arbitrator pointed out that the LRA must be construed purposively. 
This means that the LRA objects of economic development, social justice, labour peace and 
democratisation of the workplace, are fulfilled through giving effect to the obligations of the 
ILO.113 The purposive approach considers the “values”, “historic”, “textual” context and 
 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”. S 233 of the Constitution states that “[w]hen interpreting any 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”.  See also SA 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) par 25-27. The court relied on the 
ILO Conventions which include arm forces within the scope of “workers” and are therefore afforded the 
organisational rights and the right to join trade unions in terms of s 23(1). NUMSA v Bader Bob (Pty) Ltd 
(2003) BLLR 103 (CC) par 26 O’Regan J stated that when the courts interpret labour legislation, they must 
consider ILO standards. The courts emphasised that South African labour law has been afforded international 
law standard. Through the ILO Conventions, the minority unions where granted the right to strike. S v 
Makwanyane (n 65) par 39. The court confirmed that section 39(1) is broad enough to include both instruments 
which South Africa is not a party to, and those that are binding and Minister of Defence v SA National Defence 
Force Union (2006) 27 ILJ 2276 (SCA) par 6 the court made reference to s 39(1)(b) and s 233 of the 
Constitution. This judgment provides a comprehensive example of how our courts apply international law 
standards when interpreting legislation. 
108  The Constitution. 
109  Van Niekerk (n 25) 29. 
110  Van Niekerk (n 25) 21. 
111  66 of 1995 and S v Makwanyane (n 65) par 35. 
112  Oliver and Kalula (65) 59. See S v Makwanyane (n 65) par 35-39 O’Regan J held that binding and non-binding 
law is considered. See Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) par 39 for further discussion. See also S v 
Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) par 23. S v Rens 1996 1 SA 1218 (CC) par 77. Grootboom (n 72) par 24-44 and 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature In re Gauteng School Education Bill 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) par 76. 
113  Nkhape / Department of Rural Development & Agrarian Reform [2017] CCMA par 16-18 and s 1(b) of the 
LRA. 
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“comparative environment” (own emphasis) which takes into consideration of foreign law and 
international law.114 Chapter 4 discusses comparative jurisprudence of foreign law.115 
 
In casu, the ILO Interregional Tripartite Experts Meeting on Drug and Alcohol Testing in the 
Workplace states that employers may apply drug testing programs which detects accurate drug 
impairment. This provision states that “[t]o ensure programme success, the methods of 
detection to be used must be of the highest quality and reliability, taking into consideration the 
purpose of the test”.116  Where it reads - “taking into consideration the purpose of the test”, 
requires employers to use drug testing programs that are related to the purpose of the test. Put 
differently, those that detects accurate drug impairment as opposed to past impairment. 
 
International law instruments protect privacy of an employee which includes activities taking 
place at home, such as the use of cannabis in private. The State may not interfere on matters 
relating to one’s personal home. This appears in Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. International law obligations require 
employers to adopt drug test programs that detects accurate drug impairment. This component 
protects privacy of employers who consume cannabis privately at home.117 
 
3.4 Balancing of competing interests of employer and employee 
 
As appears above, the employee’s right to privacy, human dignity and equality conflicts with 
the employer’s interests to ensure safety in the workplace with drug testing policies. As Cohen 
puts forward, where there exists a conflict when applying legislation, the courts must follow 
interpretation that conforms with the Constitution. In the words of Cohen, “legislation should 
be given the meaning that best accords with the Constitution”.118 This follows sections 3(b) of 
 
114  Van Staden (n 6) 116. 
115  Chapter 4. 
116  10-14 May 1993, Oslo (Hønefoss), Norway. 
117  See further the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art 8). American 
Convention on Human Rights (art 11). The Convention on the Rights of the Child (art 16). American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (arts 5, 9 and 10). Refer to Wacks Privacy and Press Freedom 
(1995) 16-20. 
118  Cohen “Understanding Fair Labour Practices – NEWU v CCMA” 2004 SAJHR 485 and Rautenbach (n 87 
(2012)) 255 asserts that s 39(2) principle was known as the ut res magis valeat quam peret under the common-
law. 
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the LRA and 3(b) of the EEA requiring legislation to be interpreted in compliance with the 
Constitution.119 This bears testimony of the “purposive interpretation” of the legislation. 
 
The courts may give effect to the “purpose” of the right than the intention of the LRA.120 The 
purposive approach considers the values in section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution, the historic 
and textual context.121 In so far as the text is concerned, in S v Makwanyane, O’Regan J pointed 
out that when the text is observed, if there is more than one interpretation, our courts should 
opt for legislative interpretation that best conforms with the values of the Constitution.122 
 
In Assign Services (Pty) Limited v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, Dlodlo AJ 
confirmed that the LRA must be interpreted purposively.123 Dlodlo AJ canvassed the 
framework of NEHAWU where Ngcobo J pointed out that the LRA must be construed 
purposively in order to give effect to the Constitution.124 Ngcobo J stated that the LRA should 
be construed this way (purposively) - to “arrive at the balance required by… fair labour 
practices [in terms of section 23 of the Constitution]”. This also follows section 39(2) of the 
Constitution which requires statutes (LRA) to be interpreted and applied in line with the objects 
of the Constitution.125 
 
In so far as the historic context is concerned, the constitutional right to fair labour practices has 
long been articulated based on the contention formulated in the 1950s and 1960s by the father 
of labour law, Kahn-Freund.126 Navas AJ described this contention as the “famous dictum” in 
 
119  LRA and EEA. 
120  Landis “A note on ‘statutory interpretation’” 1930 Harvard Law Review (HLR) 886 888. 
121  Above. 
122  S v Makwanyane (n 65) par 9. 
123  [2018] ZACC 22 par 41. 
124  NEHAWU (n 26) par 41; refer to NUMSA v Bader Bob (n 107) 26; Schutte and others v Powerplus 
Performance (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 655 (LC) par 24-25; Johnson & Johnson v Chemical Workers Industrial 
Union (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC); Equity Aviation v SATAWU [2011] ZASCA 232 par Lewis AJ held that s 64(1) 
of the LRA must be interpreted in compliance with the Constitution as a whole; Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration case no JR 1624/16 
(LC) (Unreported) par 12 Saloojee AJ referred to s 39(2) of the Constitution and stated that the purposive 
approach is the correct interpretation of the LRA and Gumede A critical examination of the interpretation and 
application of the law relating to Temporary Employment Services in South Africa (2011 Dissertation UKZN) 
18. 
125  Above. See s 39(2) of the Constitution. The cases of Carmichael (n 32) par 43; K v Minister of Safety and 
Security [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC) par 15 and see Currie and De Waal (n 27) 150. 
126  n 128 below. 
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Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines.127 Kahn-Freund stated that the purpose of labour law is 
to “…counteract the inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees… to 
maintain equilibrium between employers and workers”.128 
 
In casu, item 7(b)(i) of the Code must be construed “purposively”, taking into consideration 
the “values”, “comparative environment”, “historic” and “textual” context. When determining 
what constitutes a reasonable drug testing policy in terms of item 7(b)(i) of the Code, the courts 
must apply the broad notion of section 23(1) of the Constitution to weigh the interests of 
employers to ensure safety with drug testing programs (considering the degree of danger of the 
employment), against the employee’s right to privacy, to reach a balance required by “fair 
labour practices” according to section 23(1) of the Constitution. This follows the requirement 
under section 36(1) of the Constitution that a limitation (of the right to privacy) must be 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom requires a balance between the limitation (workplace drug testing) and the purpose 
of the limitation (maintaining workplace safety). The primary purpose of labour law is, and has 
always been, to balance the conflicting interests between employer(s) and employee(s). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The LRA must be construed “purposively” to reach a proper balance required by “fair labour 
practices”. It is no doubt that the purpose of labour law is, both from historic and foreign law 
context, the weighing of interests between employer(s) and employee(s). Our courts should 
adopt this approach to fulfil the founding values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127  (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) par 72. 
128  Van Niekerk and Smit (n 25) 9. 
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CHAPTER 3 
South African case authority 
 
“[P]rivacy not only passes the threshold test but is clearly deserving of constitutional 
protection, absent a clear justification to the contrary.”129 
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1. Introduction 
 
On the 28th September 2018, the South African Constitutional Court handed down a landmark 
judgement on the decriminalization of cannabis. The Court only legalised private use of 
cannabis. To this end, use of dug substances in public domain remains to be illegal.130 This 
chapter discusses how Prince shapes the regulations of workplace drug testing in South Africa. 
Firstly, it is noteworthy to list different components of drug tests undertaken by employers. 
 
Components of workplace drug testing are five-fold: 
 
• random testing (testing is conducted without any notice to employees);131 
• pre-employment testing (employment is only offered on a condition of a negative drug 
test);132 
• reasonable cause testing (testing is permitted where an employer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an employee is under the influence of drugs);133 
 
129  Davis J remark in Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2017] 2 All SA 864 (WCC) 
par 31. 
130  Prince (n 3) at 39-124. 
131  Dorancy-Williams (n 196) 477 479. 
132  Dorancy-Williams (n 196) 469. 
133  Dorancy-Williams (n 196) 475 477. 
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• post-accident testing (drug screening is only undertaken after a “near miss” or accident 
in the workplace);134 and 
• pre-access testing (testing occurs before employees occupy the premises of the 
workplace).135 
 
2. Prince: Western Cape High Court 
 
In Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the Western Cape High Court 
held that certain provisions of the Acts are inconsistent with section 14 of the Constitution only 
to the extent that they prohibit possession and cultivation of cannabis for personal consumption 
in a “private dwelling” or “home”. The following paragraphs appears in the judgment: 
 
“1. The following provisions are declared inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996 and invalid, only to the extent that they prohibit the use of cannabis by an adult 
in private dwellings where the possession, purchase or cultivation of cannabis for personal consumption 
by an adult: 
 
1.1. sections 4(b) and 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 (the Drugs Act) read 
with Part III of Schedule 2 to the Drugs Act; and 
 
1.2. section 22A(9)(a)(i) of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 (the 
Medicines Act) and s 22A (10) thereof read with schedule 7 of GN R509 of 2003 published in 
terms of s 22A(2) of the Medicines Act.”
136 
 
Davis J referred to the US and Canadian case authority vis-à-vis the jurisprudence of privacy.137 
The court concluded that the impugned provisions limited upon constitutional privacy. Davis 
J stated that the limitation thereof is not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on the founding values of human dignity, equality and freedom in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. Provisions of the Drugs Act and the Medicines and Related 
Substances Act were declared invalid to the extent of the judgment.138 
 
 
134  Dorancy-William (196) 472 473. 
135  Pearce (n 257) 163 164. 
136  Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (n 129) par 132. 
137  See Chapter 4 for a comprehensive discussion on foreign case authority relating to the jurisprudence of 
privacy. 
138  See n 136 above. 
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3. Prince: Constitutional Court 
 
In the Constitutional Court, Zondo ACJ granted a confirmatory order and upheld the decision 
of the court a quo. The question before the Court was whether the impugned provisions limited 
the right to privacy. If so, the Court had to determine if the limitation was reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.139 
 
Zondo ACJ canvassed the framework of National Coalition, Khumalo v Holomisa, Curtis and 
Bernstein in relation to the jurisprudence of privacy. The Court stated that activities taking 
place in private are free from governmental intrusion. In the words of Zondo ACJ, privacy 
entails “the right to be free … from unwanted States’ [sic] intrusion into one’s privacy”.140 The 
Court took due regard of foreign case law to extend constitutional privacy to activities taking 
place in private including, inter alia, consumption of cannabis in private (see chapter 4).141 
   
The Court held that the impugned provisions limited upon the right to privacy. States cannot 
interfere in the business of one’s home. The limitation thereof is not reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on the founding values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.142 
 
4.  NUMSA obo William Julian Harris v Bargaining Council 
 
The Constitutional Court judgment left voiding gaps in the South African workplace. NUMSA 
v Bargaining Council (hereinafter “NUMSA”) bears testimony of the shortcomings in 
employment law. It is trite that employees may be dismissed for “being under the influence” 
of cannabis during working hours.143 Uncertainties of workplace drug testing stems from the 
fact that testing methods disclose cannabis consumed in the past or while in the realm of 
privacy. So, despite constitutional privacy protecting the right to use cannabis in private, 
employees may still be legible for dismissals at work on the ground of a positive drug test.144 
 
 
139  n 142 below. 
140  See Chapter 2. 
141  Chapter 4 below and Prince (n 3) par 39-129. 
142  Prince (n 3) par 129. 
143  [2015] ZALCJHB 413. 
144  Above. 
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In NUMSA, the applicants were found under the influence of cannabis following a random drug 
screening. They were given 30 days leave pay, until the substance was removed from the body. 
According to the policy, a re-test had to take place after a period of 30 days. The second test 
had to reflect negative, failing which, the employer may then hold disciplinary actions against 
employees. In casu, the second test still reflected positive and employees were dismissed.145 
 
In the CCMA, the Arbitrator upheld the dismissal. An order of the CCMA was set aside in the 
Labour Court where the issue was whether 30 or 34 days was enough period for the body to be 
clean from the substance. It also appeared in the evidence of the employer that it can take as 
far as six weeks for cannabis to be removed from the body. Coetzee AJ held that the dismissal 
is unfair because a positive drug test does not mean that the employee is intoxicated.146 
 
NUMSA neatly illustrated that onsite-drug screening by way of urine samples has the 
“catastrophic” consequences of detecting cannabis even though the employee used it privately 
at home. Although NUMSA does not base its decision on the right to privacy, nevertheless the 
court held that no reasonable decision-maker (Commissioner) could conclude that a positive 
drug test means that an employee is under the influence of cannabis at the time of the test.147 
 
Accordingly, Coetzee AJ pointed out that the meaning of “testing positive” and “being under 
the influence” should not be treated the same. An employee with a positive test of cannabis 
should not be dismissed on that account. This is because cannabis consumed few days ago 
(which is detectable), does not mean that the person thereof is still under the influence. Urine 
drug testing shows past drug impairment and not accurate or current drug impairment.148 
 
Coetzee AJ stated obiter that: 
 
“No reasonable commissioner could have come to the conclusion that the employee was under influence, 
merely for having tested positive for cannabis. That is so unreasonable that it stands to be reviewed and 
set aside.”
149
 
 
145  Refer to NUMSA (n 143) par 1-12 for a discussion of the facts of the case. 
146  [2015] ZALCJHB 413 par 5-9. 
147  See n 145 above. 
148  NUMSA (n 143) par 17-18 and Sowetan Live (12-04-2018) 1 Rhys Evan provides a commentary that “… 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), can linger in a person’s system for weeks – sometimes months for heavy users 
– which means that, even if a person is no longer “high”, they can still test positive for marijuana”. 
149  NUMSA (n 143) par 25. 
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The following may be argued against NUMSA: 
 
• the Labour Court approach requires the employer, prior to dismissal, to determine 
whether the level of drug impairment affects employees to perform duties with the 
required capacity, care and skills;150 
• this place the onus of proof upon the employer that is impractical. Therefore, the Labour 
Court approach does not conform with the OHSA.151 Section 8 of the OHSA requires 
employers to adopt practicable measures when ensuring health and safety in the 
workplace;152 and 
• it is therefore difficult or impractical for the employer to proof that employees lacked 
the ability to perform duties with the required capacity, standard, care and skills.153 
  
5. Mthembu and others / NCT Durban Wood Chips 
 
The aftermath of Prince was followed by Mthembu / NCT Durban Wood Chips (hereinafter 
“Mthembu”) where employees where dismissed after being found under the influence of 
cannabis following a drug screening. In light that Prince had just legalised private use of 
cannabis, the employees submitted that dismissal was not an appropriate sanction, as they had 
used cannabis privately at home. The CCMA, however, considered the “degree of danger” that 
the employment pose. Oakes (hereinafter “the Arbitrator”) observed that: 
 
“Because of the high degree of safety required of companies with heavy machinery and generally 
dangerous equipment, it is reasonable for employees to have in place rules prohibiting the consumption 
of such substances at the workplace or reporting to work under the influence of such substances.”
154
 
 
The Arbitrator further observed that: 
 
“[T]he Constitutional Court [in Prince] had just declared private use of cannabis legal. However, 
employers are still entitled to discipline employees who use cannabis or are under the influence during 
 
150  Joubert “https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/testing-employees-drug-abuse-south-african-workplace-mike-joub 
ert/” (25-04-2019). 
151  Above. 
152  Above. 
153  e.g. should an employee cause accident in the workplace. 
154  (2019) 28 CCMA 8.37.3 par 71-72. 
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working hours. The respondent’s operations indicated that such a prohibition was reasonable and the 
applicants knew that they were not allowed to report for work while under the influence of cannabis.”
155
 
 
The preceding passage of Mthembu shows that employers are not prohibited from dismissing 
employees for a positive drug test. Employers may therefore intrude the privacy of employees 
with urine testing system ostensibly to ensure workplace safety (especially where the nature of 
employment has a high degree of danger). The Arbitrator indicated that the employer’s interests 
to ensure health and safety in the workplace outweighs the employee’s right to privacy.156 
 
The demarcation between Mthembu and NUMSA is evident where Coetzee AJ highlights the 
problems arising from the window-period of urine testing.157 In contrast, Mthembu ignored the 
“catastrophic” consequences of urinalysis as highlighted in NUMSA. As repeatedly stated 
below, it has a negative effect on employees being dismissed even though their actions took 
place during their own time and could in no way affect their ability to perform duties safely.158 
 
The following may be argued against Mthembu:159 
 
• item 7(b)(i) of the Code of the LRA requires employers to adopt workplace rules that 
are “reasonable”. Meaning that drug testing policies must be reasonable. It may be 
argued that the Arbitrator did not construe item 7(b)(i) of the Code in compliance with 
the broad notion of the constitutional right to fair labour practices in section 23(1) of 
the Constitution. When assessing “reasonableness”, section 23(1) of the Constitution 
requires a proper balance between the conflicting interests of employer(s) and 
employee(s). A fair assessment is weighing the interests of the employer to ensure 
safety considering the danger of employment, against employee’s right to privacy, to 
reach a balance required by “fair labour practices” according to section 23(1) of the 
Constitution. Section 3(b) of the LRA giving effect to section 39(2) of the Constitution 
obliges our courts to construe the LRA in compliance with the Constitution;160 
 
155  Mthembu (n 3) par 69. 
156  Above. 
157  See NUMSA. 
158  Below and see Chapter 4. 
159  Mthembu (n 3) above. 
160  Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on the constitutional framework. 
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• section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution presupposes the “rational relationship test” which 
requires a relation between the limitation (urine testing) and its purpose (ensuring 
safety). However, urine testing is incapable of promoting its purpose of ensuring safety 
because it shows past drug impairment. The relation does not exist, and therefore the 
limitation is unreasonable and unjustifiable.161 
• the dismissal for off duty uses of cannabis infringes upon constitutional privacy which 
extends protection within the realm of one’s personal home as interpreted by Prince;162 
• the level of impairment between alcohol and cannabis differ drastically. The two should 
not be compared in the LRA. Le Roux puts forward that it is much easier to prove 
alcohol intoxication through observational symptoms,163 than it is with cannabis; 
• a positive drug test does not always mean that an employee is under the influence of 
cannabis, because urine drug test detects cannabis long after it has been used and not 
actual drug impairment. The test does not show if the employee is impaired to the extent 
that he cannot perform duties with the required capacity, standard, care and skills;164 
• considering the text of the LRA, intentionalists may argue that the LRA intended to 
permit dismissals where employees are found under the influence of drug substances 
during working hours. According to intentionalism, the aim of legislative interpretation 
is giving effect to the “real” or “subjective” intention of the statute.165 So intentionalists 
may argue that it was never the intention of the LRA to dismiss employees for past drug 
impairment. The real intention was to dismiss employees who are under the influence 
of cannabis at the time of the test. Urine drug test used by the employer in Mthembu is 
not a reliable testing method because it only shows that the employee was intoxicated 
in the past. It does not show the likelihood of drug impairment at the time of the test. 
This does not achieve what the legislature had intended; 
• therefore, it may be argued that urine testing policy upsets the balance required by “fair 
labour practices” between the employer’s continuing duty to ensure safety and the 
 
161  See s 36 of the Constitution headed “limitation of rights” and Rautenbach-Malherbe (n 173) 311-312 
discussion of the “rational relationship test”. 
162  Above. 
163  Chapter 4 and see Le Roux “Drunkenness and dismissal: When does zero tolerance is sometimes not enough” 
2013 CLL 43 indicates that alcohol is easier to prove by means of the smell, slurred speech and untidiness. 
Cannabis is difficult to prove through observational symptoms. Tanker Services (Pty) Ltd v Magudelela 1997 
12 BLLR 1552 (LAC) par 16 stated that mere observations cannot prove the degree of cannabis impairment. 
164  See n 148 above. 
165  Our courts, however, do not follow intentionalism. See Van Staden (n 6) 78-79 discussion on intentionalism. 
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employee’s right to privacy. This testing method is therefore unreasonable, and it 
constitutes a prima facie unlawful invasion of constitutional privacy;166 and 
• item 7(b)(i) of the Code states that dismissals are substantively unfair if the workplace 
rule that has been contravened is unreasonable. In the case at bar, it may be argued that 
the dismissal is unfair because urine drug testing policy used by the employer 
constitutes an unlawful invasion of constitutional privacy.167 
 
Considering the abovementioned facts, it may be argued that no reasonable decision maker 
could have upheld the dismissal of employees because urine test cannot detect accurate 
impairment. Therefore, when applying the review test adopted in Sidumo, it may be argued that 
Mthembu decision is unfair and unreasonable, and it stands to be set aside. This ruling is 
reviewable in the Labour Court.168 Although NUMSA does not base its argument on the right 
to privacy, Mthembu should adopt the approach of NUMSA for review proceedings. This owes 
to the fact that NUMSA assessed reasonableness of urine testing with due diligently. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Decriminalisation of private use of cannabis in Prince has had consequences on the regulations 
of workplace drug testing. It is difficult to strike a proper balance between employer(s) 
continuing duty to ensure safety with workplace drug tests, against employee(s) right to 
privacy. Mthembu does not assess the reasonableness of urine drug testing which only shows 
past drug impairment and not accurate drug impairment. It is no doubt that urine drug testing 
upsets the balance required by “fair labour practices” in section 23(1) of the Constitution. 
 
166  Chapter 5. 
167  Above. 
168  S 145(1) of the LRA states that “[a]ny party to a dispute who challenges a defect in any arbitration 
proceedings… may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside of the arbitration award…”. S 145(2) 
states that “[a] defect means referred to in subsection (1) means that the commissioner: (i) committed 
misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as an arbitrator; (ii) committed a gross irregularity in 
the conduct of the arbitration proceedings; (iv) exceeded the commissioners power…”. See Sidumo which 
provides a benchmark for applying the review test. See further Partington “Re(viewing) the Constitutional 
Court Decision in Sidumo” 2008 Obiter 211 stating that commissioners have an obligation to make rational 
ruling based on s 145 of the LRA. See Botma “The Role of Reasonableness in the Review of Labour 
Arbitration Awards” 2009 Obiter; Boysens “Sidumo Revisited – An Article on the Development of the Review 
Test in South Africa” 2015 Obiter and Boysens “Sidumo Revisited – The Judgment of the Constitutional 
Court” 2015 Obiter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Comparative analysis: South Africa, United States of America, 
Canada and Germany 
 
“According to functionalism, comparative legal scholars should understand different 
countries’ laws as solutions to similar problems.”169 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter undertakes a comparative legal analysis between South Africa, US, Canada and 
German. It discusses whether these State’s legal principles are comparable. Thereafter, it 
examines how foreign courts assess reasonableness to ascertain whether urine testing policy 
constitutes a prima facie unlawful invasion of the right to privacy. Comparative jurisprudence 
is utilised to ascertain how foreign courts strikes a balance of the conflicting interests of the 
employer to enhance safety with drug test policies, against the employees right to privacy. It 
articulates an important prerequisite of reasonableness adopted by foreign courts. This entails, 
inter alia, adopting drug testing method which reasonably relate to its purpose of ensuring 
safety. Meaning employers may use testing methods that detects the actual drug impairment to 
achieve the aim of maintaining safety, as opposed to those that detects past impairment.170 This 
chapter takes note of the lessons from foreign law and discusses how South African labour 
courts may seek guidance from foreign case law to positively influence our legal system.171 
 
169  Whytock (n 20) 1879 and Klaasen “Constitutional interpretation in the so-called ‘hard cases’: Revisiting S v 
Makwanyane” 2017 De Jure 2 states that the Constitution is the first source of reference for decision-making 
of the judiciary. 
170  Below. 
171  See Chapter 5. 
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2.  Compatibility of foreign legal systems to South Africa 
 
The Constitution is the starting point as the highest law of the land.172 Section 39(1)(c) paves 
the gateway for our courts to consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. In 
contrast to section 39(1)(b), this section does not impose an obligation to rely on foreign law 
as the wording reads that our courts “may consider foreign law”. Paragraphs (b) and (c) use the 
verbs “must” and “may”, respectively,173 and the latter reaffirms comparative jurisprudence. 
 
The main objective of comparative legal analysis is taking lessons from foreign legal systems. 
Comparative law scholars repeatedly argue that the primary aim of comparative law is seeking 
solutions from foreign jurisdictions.174 In S v Makwanyane, Justice Chaskalson asserts that 
comparison shows how other jurisdictions deal with vexed issues.175 Put differently, “foreign 
solutions are often comparable because they are the responses to the same problem”.176 
 
172  S 1(c) and s 2 of the Constitution refers to the supremacy of the Constitution. Refer to NEHAWU (n 26) par 
16; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa In re: The Ex parte Application of the 
President of the Republic of South Africa [2000] ZACC 1 par 19; Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) par 207; Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of 
the Republic of South Africa [2011] ZACC 23 par 30-32; Public Servants Association obo Olufunmilyi itunu 
Ugobu v Health of the Department of Health, Gauteng [2017] ZACC 45 par 32; Jacobs v S [2018] ZACC 4 
par 160; Marshall v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service [2018] ZACC 11 par 10; Glenister 
v President of the Republic of South Africa [2008] ZACC 19 par 34; Doctors for Life International v Speaker 
of the National Assembly [2006] ZACC 11 at 38; S v Mamabolo [2001] ZACC 17 par 38; Department of 
Transport v Tasima (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZACC 39 par 179; Nthabiseng Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality [2015] ZACC 10 and Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council [1998] ZACC 17 par 57. 
173  S 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. Refer to President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Limited 
[2011] ZACC 32 par 16 Ngcobo CJ states that it is of paramount importance to rely on foreign jurisdictions 
vis-à-vis comparable case law. This provides solutions on how other jurisdictions have dealt with the same 
issue. In S v Makwanyane (n 65) par 37 O’Regan J indicated that “comparative bill of rights jurisprudence” 
presupposes s 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. Rautenbach “The South African Constitutional Court’s use of 
Foreign Precedent in matters of Religion: Without fear or favour?” Philippians Education Law Journal (PELJ) 
1546 1548 observed differences between the approach of international law and foreign law. Rautenbach 
highlights the different verbs of “must” and “may” in paragraphs (b) and (c), respectively. The former imposes 
an obligation to consider international law and the latter does not impose an obligation to consider foreign law. 
Rautenbach and Du Plessis “In the Name of Comparative Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Consideration of 
German Precedents by South African Constitutional Court Judges” 2013 German Law Journal (GLJ) 1540 
1578 and Oliver and Kalula (n 65) 59 puts forward that the Constitution of South Africa is comparative law 
friendly. 
174  Pieters (n 15) 6 8. 
175  Foreign courts provide reliable precedents for our courts. Refer to S v Makwanyane (n 65) par 34 where 
Chaskalson J emphasised the value of foreign law. Chaskalson J stated that comparative law paves a way for 
our courts to take lessons on how foreign jurisdictions deal with death penalty. 
176  See n 174 above. 
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Henrico reiterates that: 
 
“[B]y looking at how other courts have interpreted cases, our courts can borrow, where applicable, 
similar approaches.”
177 
 
It remains to be an academic debate that comparative law is one dangerous area of law. So it 
must be approached with extra caution.178 In Ferreira v Levin NO, Ackermann J pointed out 
that “…comparison is of course difficult and needs to be done with circumspection because the 
right[s] [are] formulated differently in the constitutions of other countries…”.179 According to 
Kahn-Freund, it must be questioned if one country’s legal principles may be accepted in the 
environment.180 In Curtis, Mokgoro J warned that our courts may only consider foreign law 
that is “comparable”.181 Hepple reiterates that it must be established if the legal principles of 
foreign States are transplantable in our environment.182 In doing so, factors such as social, 
economic, cultural and political similarities and differences may be considered.183 
 
In casu, the US, Canada and German jurisprudence of privacy are comparable to the one 
adopted in South Africa. In Bernstein, Ackermann J confirmed that “there [is] a strong family 
resemblance in the approaches that [these four jurisdictions] took to privacy”.184 South Africa, 
US, Canada and German all adopts a written (formal) Constitution. The written fundamental 
rights are given wider interpretation by the judiciary. This is referred to as the Constitution in 
the substantive sense because rights are given “substance” to widen the scope of protection.185 
 
Davis reiterates that the text of the South African Constitution is largely fashioned from the 
Canadian Charter, with borrowings from German and US.186 A powerful resemblance exist 
 
177  Henrico (n 29) 785 786. 
178  Below. 
179  Ferreira v Levin NO (n 112) par 72 and refer to Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 2 SA 38 
(CC) par 26 where Kriegler J stated that “the use of foreign precedent requires circumspection and 
acknowledgment that transplants require careful management”. 
180  Kahn-Freund and K v Minister of Safety and Security (n 125) par 34-35. 
181  Curtis (n 5) par 30. 
182  Hepple (n 19) 1 13. 
183  Pieters (n 15) 1 35. 
184  Currie and De Waal (n 27) 297 and Bernstein (n 5) par 59-118. 
185  See the Constitution, the Canadian Charter and German Basic Law. 
186  Davis “Constitutional borrowing: The influence of legal culture and local history in the reconstitution of 
comparative influence: The South African experience” 2003 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
(IJCL) 191. 
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between the Constitutions of South Africa, US, Canada and German. It is therefore of pivotal 
importance to consider these foreign jurisdictions when interpreting the Bill of Rights.187 
 
3. Foreign case authority 
 
3.1 US Federal law 
 
The US consists of the Federal and States laws. The first ten Amendments of the Federal 
Constitution of the US contains the Bill of Rights. Amendment 4 deals with the right to be 
secured from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 
Amendment 4 reads as follows: 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or confirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”
188
 
 
The South African Constitution contains the right to privacy explicitly. In contrast, the US 
Constitution does not expressly contain constitutional privacy.189 It is, however, implicit in the 
First, Third, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. It has been quoted that these 
amendments create a “zone of privacy”.190 
 
187  Refer to Bernstein (n 5) par 133 Kriegler J stated that “[c]omparative study is always useful, particularly where 
Courts in exemplary jurisdictions have grappled with universal issues confronting us…”. Davis (n 186) 192 
states that Constitutions of US, Canada and German have played a pivotal role in shaping the Bill of Rights of 
South Africa and Prince (n 3) par 79 Zondo ACJ highlighted the overlap between the Constitutions of South 
Africa, Canada and US States such as California and New York. The Court stated that these States are 
democratic societies based on the values of human dignity, freedom and equality. 
188  Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (hereinafter “US Constitution”). 
189  The Constitution of South Africa explicitly contains the right to privacy in s 14. 
190  On other hand, the US Constitution does not expressly state the right to privacy. In Grisworld v Conncticut 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas opined that different fundamental rights in the Constitution reaffirms or 
“create a zone of privacy”. First Amendment forms part of the zone. Stanley v. Georgia 394 US 557 564 (1965) 
is a source of reference of the First Amendment. The court stated that if this provision means anything, this 
also suggests that the States interference in a man’s personal life at home is ultra vires. The State has no power 
to control what a person does in his private home. Justice Douglas further opined that the Third Amendment 
prohibits soldiers from quartering in any house without the consent of the owner and the prescribed law. Firth 
Amendment permits citizens to form “a zone of privacy” for protection against government intrusion. The US 
Supreme Court stated that Fourth Amendment, read with Firth Amendment, are implicit of the protection of 
privacy against the States interference in a man’s private life and see Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) where 
Justice Blackmun opined that the right of personal privacy does not exist explicitly in the Constitution. 
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The US Constitution is comparable to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of German 
(hereinafter “the German Basic Law”). The Constitution of German does not expressly provide 
the right to privacy, but it appears in different parts of the Constitution. For example, the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted Articles 4 (right to freedom of belief), 10 (postal 
communications) and 13 (inviolability of the home), to add substance to the jurisprudence of 
privacy.191 
 
On the other hand, the US Constitution is also comparable to the Canadian Constitution. 
Protection of privacy is not expressly mentioned. The Constitution only provides protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures in section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (hereinafter “the Charter”).192 So it is in the hands of the courts to step in, to give 
meaning and broaden the scope of the right to privacy. 
 
In Bernstein, Ackermann J stated obiter that: 
 
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not specifically provide for the protection of 
personal privacy. As in the United States the issue arises in connection with the protection of persons 
against unreasonable search and seizure, which in Canada is afforded by section 8 of the Charter. In 
defining the scope of this protection the Canadian Courts have adopted an approach similar to that 
followed in United States jurisprudence.”
193
 
 
US courts where usually confronted with searches and seizures in relation to property.194 In 
1989, the US Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of drug testing within the context 
of the workplace in Skinner v. Railway Executives Association (hereinafter “Skinner”).195 The 
 
191  Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949 (herein after “German Basic Law”) and (CCT23/95) 
[1996] ZACC 2 par 77. 
192  Canadian Charter. 
193  Bernstein (n 5) par 75 and see Prince (n 3) par 45 where the Constitutional Court states that the two-stage 
enquiry of, inter alia, subjective and objective test, is adopted by the US, German, Canada and Australian 
courts. 
194  In 1957, for the first time, the court dealt with searches and seizures relating to bodily searches. Previously, in 
Breithaupt v. Abram 352 U.S. 432 (1957) the court dealt with the admissibility of blood evidence obtained 
from an unconscious person. In Schumerber v. California 384 U.S. (1966) the Supreme Court specifically deal 
with the constitutionality of blood test in terms of the Fourth Amendment and United States v Montoya de 
Hernandez 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
195  Skinner (n 7) below. 
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US Supreme Court stated that drug testing of employees through blood or urine constitutes 
Fourth Amendment search by virtue that bodily search intrudes one’s personal privacy.196 
 
3.2 The US States Laws 
 
In Olmstead v. United States, Brandeis J made an important remark in the dissenting judgment. 
The US Supreme Court mentioned that the right to privacy means “the right to be let alone – 
the most comprehensive right and the right most valued by civilised men”.197 South African 
courts hold the same view regarding the meaning of privacy. This appears in a series of cases 
such as Bernstein, Khumalo v Holomisa, National Coalition, Curtis and Prince.198 
 
Katz v. United States pointed out that when determining whether a search constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search, the court adopts a two-staged enquiry. Firstly, there must be an expectation 
of privacy from an individual (subjective test) and the expectation of privacy must “be one that 
the society is prepared to recognise as ‘reasonable’” (objective test).199 South Africa, Canada 
and German jurisprudence of privacy follow similar approach.200 
 
In Ravin v. State of Alaska (hereinafter “Ravin”), the Supreme Court of Alaska canvassed the 
framework of Coats v. Dish Network where the Supreme Court of Colorado broadly construed 
constitutional privacy, stating that employers are prohibited from dismissing employees for 
off-duty activities.201 Ravin stated that constitutional privacy protects activities taking place in 
 
196  See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association (n 7) par 13-18. See further French “Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Association and the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause Requirement: Special 
Needs Exception Creating a Shakedown Inspection” 1990 Catholic University Law Review (CULR) 118 120. 
Dorancy-Williams “The Difference Between Mine and Thine: The Constitutionality of Public Employee Drug 
Testing” 1998 New Mexico Law Review (N.M. L Rev) 459 463. Schmerber par 77 the Supreme Court, for the 
first time, held that blood test constitutes Fourth Amendment search. In National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) the court confirmed that urine and blood drug tests constitutes a search 
in terms of the Fourth Amendment. Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co. 129 N.J. 81 (N.J. 1992) the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that. Chendler v. Miller 520 U.S. 305 (1997) the court determined the 
constitutionality of Georgia’s statute that urine drug testing based on the Fourth Amendment. Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton 515 U.S. 646 (1995) the Supreme Court questioned the constitutionality of random drug 
testing policy based on the Fourth Amendment. McDonnel v. Hunter. Lovvorn v. City of Chatanooga, 846 
F.2d 1539. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy and Capeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept. 
197  277 U.S. 478 (1928). 
198  See n 5 above. 
199  Dorancy-Williams (n 196) 455 456 and Von Raab (n 196) above. 
200  See n 184 above. 
201  LLC, 2015 CO 44. 
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private including, amongst others, the use of cannabis. In justifying this rationale, Ravin 
reasoned that the State cannot interfere with a person’s business at home, unless if the intrusion 
thereof is reasonable and justifiable.202 The important passage reads that “privacy of an 
individual cannot be breached absent a persuasive showing of a close and substantial 
relationship of the intrusion to a legitimate governmental interest”.203 In Prince, the South 
African Constitutional Court used Ravin as the gateway to legalise private use of cannabis.204 
 
Searches and seizures are reasonable if they conform with the Fourth Amendment. There must 
be an intrusion of privacy and the intrusion thereof must be reasonable. In the words of 
Dorancy-Williams, “[t]he Constitution only prohibits those searches and seizures that are 
unreasonable”.205 The courts’ assessment of “reasonableness” in ascertaining whether testing 
policies are reasonable within the Fourth Amendment is a matter of controversy in the US.206 
 
The case of Skinner provides a conceptual cornerstone within which the regulation of 
workplace drug testing was brought into sharp focus. In the District Court of California, 
reasonableness of urine testing where an employee has not established reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause was under scrutiny. Put differently, the District Court ascertained whether 
random testing by way of urinalysis constitutes a reasonable search within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.207 The District Court stated that reasonableness of urine testing must be 
assessed through balancing the competing interests of the employer and employee. The 
individual employee’s constitutional privacy was weighed against the employer’s interests of 
ensuring safety.208 The District Court held that employee’s work as railway drivers posed 
 
202  537 P.2d 494 (Ak. 1975). 
203  Above. 
204  Prince (n 3) par 72-75. 
205  Dorancy-Williams (n 196) 463. 
206  Above. 
207  Refer to Skinner. 
208  Skinner (n 7) above. In Chandler V. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), the court held that Georgia statute that 
required a negative drug test as a condition for appointment to state offices, to be unconstitutional. The court 
reasoned that public safety is not endangered in this case. See also Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co. 
129 N.J. (N.J. 1992) where Clifford J used “public policy” to weight the employees’ interests of privacy, 
against the employer’s interest to ensure safety. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that public safety 
outweighs individual privacy. The court reasoned that public policy favoured public safety. Mthembu (n 3) par 
81 the CCMA upheld the dismissal of the employees for a positive drug test because the nature of employment 
posed risk. See Vernonia School District 47J v. Action par 652-653 the court asserts that the reasonableness 
test entails, inter alia, balancing a legitimate governmental interest against an individual’s constitutional 
privacy in terms of the Fourth Amendment. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) and Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 185 W. Va 155, 406 S.E.2d 52 (1990). 
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danger to the public and co-employees. Skinner held that urine testing is reasonable within the 
Fourth Amendment because public safety outweighs the employee’s right to privacy.209 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal overturned the judgment of the District Court and stated 
that reasonable suspicion or warrant requirement is necessary for the test to be justified in terms 
of Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court quoted an important remark from the case of 
Terry v. Ohio where it reads that “…urine test is [sic] not reasonably related in the scope of the 
circumstances which justified the interferences”. Put differently, urine testing bares no rational 
connection to a legitimate purpose of enhancing safety. The Ninth Circuit Court concluded 
eloquently that on-site drug screening by way of urine constitutes an unreasonable search.210 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held: 
 
“[B]lood and urine tests intended to establish drug use other than alcohol are not reasonably related to 
the stated purpose of the tests because the tests cannot measure current drug intoxication or degree of 
impairment.”
211
 
 
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal was later overturned by the Supreme Court 
in holding that urine testing constitutes a reasonable search in terms of the Fourth Amendment. 
In the majority judgment, Kennedy J pointed out that employees worked in an environment 
that is characterised by a high degree of danger. The Supreme Court turned a blind eye on the 
disadvantages of urinalysis and held that there is a “special need” to conduct urine testing 
without a warrant or reasonable suspicion because employees’ position as railway drivers is 
characterised by danger. In the words of Justice Syllabus, public safety outweighs the 
employee’s constitutional privacy.212 The dissenting judgment, however, provides a rich 
precedent on whether urine testing constitutes a reasonable search (our emphasis). 
 
The dissent of Justice Marshall notes that: 
 
“[T]he FRA conceded that urine test cannot measure current impairment; they can only measure drug or 
alcohol use within the last two months.”
213
 
 
209  French (n 196) 120. 
210  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
211  Dorancy-Williams (n 196) 460. 
212  Skinner (n 7) above. 
213  French (n 196) 151. 
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Justice Marshall, in his dissenting judgment, concurred with the approach of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeal.214 Justice Marshall neatly illustrates that on-site drug screening by way of 
urinalysis is not rationally related to the purpose of the test and therefore contravenes the 
“rational relationship test”. Put differently, urinalysis cannot contribute towards promoting the 
stated purpose of the test because it has the disadvantage of showing past drug impairment. 
This approach is similar to but more comprehensive than the approach of the South African 
case of NUMSA (see chapter 3).215 As appears above, although Skinner and NUMSA used 
different conceptual routs, both judgments declared urine drug screening to be unjust. The 
dissenting judgment in Skinner indicating that a positive drug screening by way of urinalysis 
is not a legitimate ground for dismissal was purely based on constitutional privacy. In contrast, 
NUMSA did not base such finding on the ground of constitutional privacy as done in Skinner. 
 
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Skinner and the South African decision of 
Mthembu turned a blind eye on the fact that drug screening by way of urine samples has 
detrimental consequences of detecting cannabis used in the past. Although Skinner is more 
comprehensive in striking a balance between the competing interests of the employer 
(enhancing safety) and employee (constitutional privacy).216 This chapter, as discussed below, 
reflects a complex picture of the overlap between Skinner and Canadian case law.217  
 
3.3 Canada 
 
It goes without saying that the overlap between the South African Constitution and the 
Canadian Charter takes the centre stage within the comparative law fraternity. It is no surprise 
that South African courts often refer to Canadian law. Traditionally, as Davis noted, it is 
understood that the Constitutional Court of Canada plays an important role in shaping the way 
in which the South African courts interpret the Bill of Rights.218 
 
The Canadian Charter contains similar values underlying the Constitution of South Africa. The 
Charter states that “Canada is founded upon the principles that recognises the supremacy of 
 
214  Above. 
215  See Chapter 3 for a discussion on the South African judgment of NUMSA. 
216  See Skinner and Chapter 3 for a discussion of Mthembu. 
217  Below 48-49. 
218  Davis (n 186) 191 192. 
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God and the rule of law”.219 Section 1(c) and the Preamble of the South African Constitution, 
respectively, states that “[m]ay God protect our people”220 and that “[t]he Republic is founded 
on the following values: [s]upremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”.221 
 
Section 12 of the Charter stating that “everyone is equal before the law and has equal benefits 
and protection of the law”, is no doubt, identical to the South African equality clause under 
section 9(1) of the Constitution.222 Courts often argue that equality extends to the realm of the 
workplace and that privacy is captured in the observation of human dignity.223 
 
Section 8 of the Charter provides for the “right to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures”. Although the right to privacy, as noted above, is not explicitly stated like in South 
Africa, the Canadian courts nevertheless interpret section 8 of the Charter through protecting 
constitutional privacy.224 Like all other right, constitutional privacy is not absolute, and it may 
therefore be limited according to a general limitation clause. 
 
As has been the case in the US, the Canadian courts have seen much distress on workplace 
drug testing. This typically occurs when the rights of the employer and employee come into 
conflict.225 On the one hand, the Canadian courts considers section 2(1) of the OHSA which 
requires employers to enhance safety in the workplace.226 Pearce states that drug testing 
 
219  S 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the Constitution of Canada is the “supreme law” of the country. 
In Fedsure Life Assurance (n 172) par 25 Chaskalson P, Goldstone J and O’Regan J reiterates that the Charter 
of Canada is the supreme law of Canada. Hogg “Supremacy of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” 
1983 The Canadian Bar Review (TCBR) 69 states that the Canadian Charter is the supreme law of Canada and 
that any laws enacted by the Parliament or the Legislature which are inconsistent with the Constitution are of 
no force or effect. The Charter trumps any provincial or federal legislature which is inconsistent with the 
Charter and S 2 of the South African Constitution also states that “law or conduct inconsistent with [the 
Constitution] is invalid, and the obligations imposed by [the Constitution] must be fulfilled”. Davis (n 186) 
195 argued that similarities of the underlying values plays an important role in comparative jurisprudence. Put 
differently, similar values determine whether Constitutions of different countries are comparable. 
220  Preamble of the Constitution 
221  S 1(c) of the Constitution. 
222  The Charter. 
223  Above. 
224  Above. 
225  Academic scholars often refer to the balancing of competing interests between employer and employee when 
confronted with workplace drug testing. This approach is adopted by courts in US, Canada and German. 
Although the South African courts are silent on how to construe the LRA in way which balances these interests. 
226  Section 2(1) of the Occupational Health Safety Act R.S.A. 2000, C. O-2 provides that “[e]very employer shall 
ensure, as far as it is reasonably practicable for the employer to do so, (a) The health and safety of (i) Workers 
engaged in the work of that employer”. 
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policies are necessary for the employer’s productivity and liability.227 On the other end, the 
courts considers the employees’ rights in Human Rights, Citizenship and Multicultural Act.228 
 
The case of Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd (hereinafter “Entrop”) is foundational to the regulation 
of drugs and provides a landmark judgment vis-à-vis workplace drug testing in Canada. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with post-accident testing, pre-employment testing, reasonable 
cause testing, mandatory testing and random testing.229 The court upheld pre-employment, 
post-accident, mandatory and reasonable cause testing as reasonable searches.230 
 
Entrop, however, stated that random alcohol testing may be justified as a bona fide 
occupational requirement (BFOD) in the workplace that is characterised by a high degree of 
danger. On the other hand, the Appeal Court held that random testing of cannabis by way of 
urine is not justified in a safety-sensitive workplace environment.231 Entrop drew a fine line 
between “cannabis” and “alcohol” testing, respectively, stating that “random testing [of 
cannabis] through urine does not disclose that the person is impaired at the time of the test, but 
only shows the presence of metabolites which only discloses cannabis [sic] consumed in the 
past”, whereas alcohol testing through breathalyser detects the actual impairment. The latter 
testing method was declared to be a reasonable requirement for employees in a safety-sensitive 
workplace.232 In justifying this rationale, Entrop reasoned that alcohol testing is reasonably 
related to the purpose of the test. In contrast, cannabis testing by way of urine samples was 
declared unreasonable because it is incapable of promoting its aim of ensuring safety.233 
 
227  Pearce (n 257) 144. Refer to Entrop v. Imperial Oil (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 18 (C.A.) par 94 where the court 
states that the employer has a right to ensure that employees are fit to perform duties with the required capacity, 
care and skill. This contention appears in the cases of Canadian Pacific v. U.T.U [989] 2 S.C.R. 654; Monarch 
Fine Food Co. Ltd v. Milk & Bread Drivers, Diary Employees, Caters & Allied Employees, Local 647 (1978),  
20 L.A.C.(2d) 419 (Ont); B.P Oil (1972) 24 L.A.C. 122 (Palmer) and Lake Ontario Steel Co. Ltd (1970) 22 
L.A.C. 206 (Hanrahan). 
228  Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14 and Pearce (n 257) 142. 
229  Entrop below. 
230  Entrop (n 227) above. 
231  Above. 
232  Employment Law Conference “Drug and Alcohol Testing: Recent Developments in the Law” Paper 10.1 
(2013) 10.1.2-10.1.3 and Imperial Oli par 11 the Ontario Court of Appeal applied the approach of Entrop. The 
Court of Appeal distinguished between random testing of alcohol and random testing of cannabis. The Appeal 
Court confirmed that alcohol test of breathalyser is reasonable because it detects the actual impairment. 
Whereas random drug test is unreasonable for employees in safety-sensitive positions, because it does not 
disclose current drug impairment. A strong emphasis is on the difference of the detection window period 
between alcohol and cannabis. 
233  Below. 
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The important passage of Entrop reads: 
 
“[U]rinalysis is not justified as a bona fide occupational requirement because it was not reasonably 
necessary to further the goal of protecting workplace and public safety.”
234
 
 
In Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Communication, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 
(hereinafter “Imperial Oil”), the employer adopted the approach of Entrop and reintroduced 
random drug testing policy with a new technology testing program by way of saliva samples.235 
The is also known as “oral fluids test” or “mouth swab drug test”.236 This testing method does, 
according to the company, conform with the approach of Entrop. The employer pointed out 
that saliva testing is accurate and effective because it discloses the likelihood of impairment at 
the time of the test as a result of using cannabis. The court, however, dismissed the employer’s 
submissions (our emphasis) and declared that saliva drug testing is unreasonable.237  
 
The employer’s submission in Imperial Oil reads as follows: 
 
“Scientific studies have shown that while the most dramatic detrimental effects from the use of marijuana 
occur within the first two hours after drug use, significant deficits in some performance areas persist for 
four hours or longer. This means that test results that indicate marijuana use within the previous four 
hours will indicate likely impairment. Exactly how long an individual will test positive following the use 
of marijuana depends on a number of factors, but it is unlikely that someone will test positive after four 
hours using an oral fluid test. As a result, we can conclude that a person who tests positive for marijuana 
on a random oral fluid test is likely impaired at the time of the test.”
238 
 
The employer further submitted that: 
 
“Company's return to random, unannounced drug testing, after the suspension of urinalysis tests in the 
wake of Entrop, was only made possible by the oral fluid drug test technology which does detect actual 
impairment of cannabis.”
239 
 
The employer relied on the approach of Entrop in stating that a drug testing is rational if it is 
connected to its aim of maintaining safety.240 The approach of Entrop and Imperial Oil overlaps 
with the US dissenting judgment by Justice Marshall in Skinner. It is also evident in the US 
 
234  Entrop (n 227) above and Pearce (n 257) 147. 
235  900, 2009 ONCA 420, 96 O.R. (3d) 668. 
236  See Pearce (n 257) 161 and Casolin “Comparison of Urine and Oral Fluid for Workplace Drug Testing” 2016 
Journal of Analytical Toxicology (JAT) 480. 
237  Below and refer to Pearce (n 257) 161. 
238  Imperial Oil (n 232) par 11. 
239  Par 60. 
240  Above. 
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Ninth Circuit Court where the judgment reads that - “…urine test intended to establish drug 
use other than alcohol is [sic] not reasonably related to the stated purpose of the tests because 
the tests cannot measure current drug intoxication or degree of impairment…”.241 Similarly, as 
stated in the previous chapters, the South African limitation clause requires the limitation (drug 
testing policy) to be capable of promoting its purpose (of ensuring workplace safety).242 The 
key difference between the approach of Canada and US is evident in Skinner, where the court 
of first instance acknowledged that “reasonableness” of testing systems is assessed through 
weighing the interests of the employer to enhance safety and the employees right to privacy.243 
 
The conceptual rout used by the employer in Imperial Oil is identical to the approach of the 
Australian courts where saliva or oral fluids test is regarded as a reliable testing method than 
urinalysis. In Endeavour Energy v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, 
Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (hereinafter “Endeavour 
Energy”), the court recalls that “…a method which test for recent consumption is more likely 
to identify someone who is impaired… oral fluid testing is better indicator of likely impairment 
as a result of smoking cannabis than a urine test. Indeed, urine testing may be unable to identify 
that someone has smoked cannabis in the previous four hours – precisely the time frame which 
is most relevant for identifying likely impairment”.244  
 
Endeavour Energy concluded eloquently and succinctly: 
 
“That [sic] [n]ot only is urine testing potentially less capable of identifying someone who is under the 
influence of cannabis, but it also has the disadvantage that it may show a positive result even though it 
is several days since the person has smoked the substance. This means that a person may be found to 
have breached the policy even though their actions were taken in their own time and in no way affect 
their capacity to do their job safely. In the circumstances where oral fluid testing – which does have this 
advantage – is readily available, I find that the introduction of urine testing by the applicant would be 
unjust and unreasonable. Accordingly, I find that the system of drug testing that should be used by the 
applicant for on-site drug testing should be that involving oral fluids.”
245 
 
Endeavour Energy canvassed the framework of Shell Refining (Australia) v Construction, 
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (hereinafter “Shell Refining”) to pave the way for most 
 
241  Skinner (n 7) above. 
242  Refer to Chapter 3 and s 36(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
243  See Skinner where the Supreme Court dealt with the test of reasonableness comprehensively and Von Raab (n 
196) above. 
244  (2012) FWAFB 4998 (14 August 2012) par 40. 
245  Endeavour Energy (n 244) par 41. 
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employers to move from urine to saliva testing system in Australia. To this point, based on the 
empirical evidence in a series of cases such as Entrop, Imperial Oil, Shell Refining and 
Endeavour Energy, saliva testing system is no doubt a legitimate mechanism through which 
employers may regulate on-site drug screening. In support of this sentiment, Pearce cited the 
case of Entrop and argued further that saliva testing policy strikes a fair balance between the 
employer’s duty to enhance workplace safety and the employee’s right to privacy.246 
 
3.4 Germany 
 
In German, there is no explicit or specific laws on workplace drug testing. It is, however, 
permissible for employers to implement drug testing policies. Generally, drug testing is not 
permitted without employee’s consent even though testing is justified based on occupational 
and safety reasons. It is accepted that the employer may consider the right to privacy of the 
employee and the degree of danger that the employment pose. If the nature of employment is 
safety sensible, such as working with dangerous machines or public transport, the safety of co-
workers and public will trump the right to privacy of the employee.247 
 
Drug screening is permitted if the use of drugs has been implicitly or explicitly prohibited to 
the employee according to the workplace policy. The employer’s legitimacy to prohibit drug 
use is not explicitly stated in the law, but it is based on the OHSA (hereinafter 
“Arbeitsschutzgesetz”). This appears in sections 3 and 7 of the Arbeitsschutzgesetz.248 In 
Humburg, the Labour Court pointed out that the employer has the “right to ask questions”, as 
far as the employer has a reasonable and legitimate interest in the answers based on the 
employment relationship. This also includes information in relation to drug consumption. As 
stated, there is no law regulating drug testing because this depends on the employer’s policy.249 
 
4. Summary of foreign case law 
 
As appears above, South Africa, US, Canada, German and Australian courts have similarities 
and differences. The principles of these five jurisdictions may be adjusted and developed to 
 
246  (2008) AIRC 510 (25 August 2008); (2008) (2015) FWC 2384 (8 April 2015) and Pearce (n 257) 161. 
247  Cashford Laboratories “https://blog.cansfordlabs.co.uk/workplace-drug-testing-rules-europe” (08-04-2019). 
248  The German Occupational Health and Safety Act (hereinafter “Arbeitsschutzgesetz”). 
249  Hamburg, 01.09.2006 - 27 Ca 136/06.  
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remedy their flaws on workplace drug testing. In as much, certain portions of these judgments 
have positives to take into cognisance. The courts’ judgments are summarised as follows: 
 
• in Skinner, the US Supreme Court offers little insight by not assessing reasonableness 
of urine drug test. Indeed, this is a totally misleading judgment for ignoring a concern 
that urine testing only detects past impairment. However, positives may be drawn from 
the dissenting judgment and the court a quo where reasonableness of urine test was 
assessed with due diligence. It was stated that random testing by way of urine 
constitutes an unreasonable search because such testing method cannot rationally 
achieve the purpose of ensuring safety by virtue that it detects past impairment, and not 
the likelihood of impairment at the time of the test. The Supreme Court, however, 
established what constitutes a reasonable testing system through weighing of the 
employer’s duty to enhance safety, against the right to privacy of employees;250 
• the Canadian Supreme Court provides an important benchmark. Entrop held that an 
important prerequisite of reasonableness is ensuring that the purpose of the drug test is 
rationally related to the test. Similarly, random testing through urine was declared 
unreasonable because the test does not relate to its purpose by virtue that it shows past 
impairment. In Imperial Oil, the employer adopted the approach of Entrop and 
submitted that saliva test is a reasonable testing system because it detects actual drug 
impairment, as opposed to urinalysis which shows past impairment. Although Imperial 
Oil held that saliva testing is unreasonable, positives may be drawn from the employer’s 
submission because it conforms with Entrop and the dissenting judgment of Skinner.251 
The approach of Entrop  is also identical to the Australian cases of Endeavour Energy 
and Shell Refining where employers had to move from urine to saliva testing;252 
• the German courts have not dealt much with workplace drug testing. Positives may be 
drawn from the employer’s drug testing policies which requires a balance of interests 
between employer and employee. Drug screening is only permitted with the consent of 
employees. But this depends on the company’s workplace policies. Therefore, German 
regulation on workplace drug testing needs to be developed;253 and 
 
250  Above 43-45. 
251  Above 47-49. 
252  Above 49-50. 
253  Above 50. 
 52 
 
• the South African judgment of Mthembu is subject to constitutional scrutiny for 
upholding dismissal as an appropriate sanction following a positive drug screening. 
Mthembu turned a blind eye on the fact that on-site drug screening by way of urine 
samples has the “catastrophic” consequences of detecting past impairment. In other 
words, employees where dismissed even though their actions took place in private and 
could in no way affect their ability to perform duties safely.254 This error, as discussed 
above, is also evident in the majority judgment of the US Supreme Court in Skinner.255 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Comparative law fraternity plays a vital role in shaping the way in which the South African 
courts interpret the Bill of Rights. Chapter 2 asserts that when establishing what constitutes a 
reasonable drug test in terms of item 7(b)(i) of the Code, our courts should adopt a “purposive 
approach” taking into consideration of the “values”, “text”, “historic” context and 
“comparative environment”.256 In so far as the “comparative environment” is concerned, 
chapter 4 provides a comparative analysis from foreign law. Foreign courts argue that what 
constitutes a reasonable drug test should be established through weighing the interests of the 
employer to enhance safety with drug tests, against the employee’s right to privacy. To ensure 
a fair balance, employers may use testing methods that show accurate drug impairment to fulfil 
the aim of maintaining safety, as opposed to those that show past drug impairment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254  Chapter 3. 
255  Above 43-45. 
256  Chapter 2. 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART C: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
“In any society the rights of one will inevitably come into conflict with the rights of others. It 
is obvious then that all rights must be limited in the interest of preserving a social structure in 
which each right may receive protection without undue interference with others. This will be 
especially important where special relationship exist, in the case at bar the relationship of 
employer and employee.”257 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of labour law entails the balancing of unequal power between employer(s) and 
employee(s).258 Pearce argues that this branch of law searches for an appropriate balance.259 
South African courts are silent on workplace drug testing and this disturbs a fair balance. An 
obvious reason is that there is not much case authority on workplace drug testing in South 
Africa. So, this area of law should be developed. This chapter argues that South African courts 
may use foreign case law as source of reference. Particularly the US, Canada and German legal 
systems. These jurisdictions provide meaningful solutions to strike a balance between the 
employer’s desire to ensure safety with drug testing policies and employee’s right to privacy. 
 
This chapter provides findings on how courts assess the test of reasonableness to establish 
whether urine testing amounts to a prima facie unlawful invasion of privacy. Thereafter it 
 
257  Pearce “Balancing Employer Policies and Employee Rights: The Role of Legislation in addressing Workplace 
Alcohol and Drug Testing Programs” 2008 Alberta Law Review (ALR) 142 and refer to Ontario (Human Rights 
Commission) v. Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R 536 par 554. 
258  See Otto-Kahn Freund’s famous quote in pages 27 and 59. 
259  Pearce (n 257) 142. 
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establishes which drug testing policies may be regarded as “reasonable”. It provides 
recommendations for South African workplaces to adopt drug test policies that are reasonable. 
This chapter provides concluding remarks and a way forward for South African labour law. 
 
2. Findings 
 
2.1 The predicament of Mthembu 
 
South African decision of Mthembu is subject to fierce debate. It may be argued that urine 
testing used by the employer in Mthembu constitutes a prima facie unlawful invasion of 
constitutional privacy. As Pearce puts forward, random drug testing through urine “upset the 
balance between interests of employer(s) and employee(s)”.260 Urine testing is not reasonably 
related to its purpose of maintaining safety because it detects past drug impairment and not 
accurate impairment. Section 3(b) of the LRA read with section 39(2) of the Constitution 
requires our courts to construe the LRA in compliance with the Constitution. Mthembu should 
have construed item 7(b)(i) of the Code in conformity with the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices in section 23(1) of the Constitution. To determine if a drug testing policy is 
reasonable, Mthembu should have construed “reasonableness” in item 7(b)(i) of the Code by 
weighing the conflicting interests of employer(s) and employee(s) to reach the balance required 
by “fair labour practices” according to section 23(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the 
employer’s desire to ensure safety with drug testing policies must be weighed with employee’s 
right to privacy to reach a fair balance. This interpretation correlates with the Constitution.261 
 
2.2 Foreign courts response to Mthembu 
 
Our courts are silent on how to apply the test of reasonableness. Foreign courts of the US, 
German and Canada provides a comprehensive interpretation on when an employee has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy”. The test of reasonableness is applied through balancing 
of competing interests between employer and employee. Foreign courts have dwelled more on 
what constitutes a reasonable drug test policy. Most importantly, foreign courts states that for 
a drug test to be reasonable, “the test intended to establish drug use should reasonably relate to 
 
260  Pearce (n 257) 157. 
261  Chapter 2 § 3. 
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the purpose of the test” of ensuring safety. This suggest that employers may apply drug testing 
programs which detects accurate drug impairment, as opposed to past drug impairment.262 
 
2.3 Problems in the jurisprudence of privacy 
 
Although our courts clearly point out that privacy is established where there is a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”. Our courts, however, attaches no meaning to reasonableness. 
Therefore, academics argue that the jurisprudence of privacy does not provide a clear definition 
of privacy. Put differently, the definition of privacy is vague or ambiguous.263 
 
2.4 Epilogue 
 
There is not much case law that dealt with workplace drug testing policies to use as a guideline. 
Mthembu bears testimony that our courts do not dwell on the test of reasonableness and whether 
urine drug test is reasonable. Mthembu turned a blind eye on the fact that urine drug test does 
not disclose actual or current intoxication. As a result, employees who consumed cannabis in 
the past or privately at home (which is legal within the jurisprudence of privacy), are exposed 
to possible disciplinary actions and dismissals on the ground of a positive drug test.264 
 
3. Recommendations 
 
South African courts must construe the LRA in light with the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. Where there is a conflict, our courts may adopt legislative interpretation that 
best accords with the Constitution. In casu, the “purposive interpretation” provides legislative 
interpretation that best correlates with the Constitution. This interpretational rout obliges our 
courts to fulfil the objects of the LRA through giving effect to section 23 of the Constitution 
and ILO obligations. The purposive approach takes into consideration of the “values”, “text”, 
“historic” context and “comparative environment”. In the case at bar, to establish what 
constitutes a reasonable drug testing policy, the LRA must be construed through weighing the 
employee’s right to privacy, against the employer’s continuing duty to ensure safety, to reach 
a balance required by “fair labour practices” according to section 23(1) of the Constitution. 
 
262  Chapter 4. 
263  See Chapter 2. 
264  Above. 
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Historically and based on foreign law, it has long been accepted that the “proximate purpose” 
of labour law entails the balancing of interests between the employer(s) and employee(s).265 
 
To ensure a fair balance, our courts should take cognisance of an important prerequisite. This 
entails, amongst others, adopting testing methods that shows the likelihood of drug impairment 
at the time of the test to fulfil the aim of maintaining safety, as opposed to testing methods that 
show past drug impairment. This requirement is conferred by international law obligations and 
foreign case law of which our courts are open to rely on.266 The following may be considered 
when implementing workplace drug testing policies: 
 
• it must be clear that alcohol tests and drug tests do not show the same outcome. On the 
one hand, alcohol test through breathalyser disclose recent consumption. In contrast, 
cannabis testing through urinalysis or blood samples, detects the drug long after it has 
been consumed. The former testing method is reasonably related to the purpose of the 
test because it detects current impairment. The latter tests are not rationally related to 
the purpose of ensuring safety because they do not detect current or actual drug 
impairment. Alcohol and cannabis testing should be regulated separate in the LRA;267 
• a “positive drug test” and “being under the influence” of cannabis should be treated 
separate. A positive drug test does not necessarily mean that the person is currently 
intoxicated. Employees should not be dismissed solely based on a positive drug test;268 
• employers should not solely rely on urine or blood drug tests to prove drug 
impairment;269 
• drug testing policies must consider safety-sensitiveness of the job and determine if drug 
intoxication affects the employee’s ability to perform duties with the required capacity, 
care and skills. This should be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the degree 
of danger the employment pose or the nature of employment;270 
• prior to a mandatory drug test, employees should be given notice and reasonable period 
for the drug to be cleared from the body;271 
 
265  Chapter 2 § 4. 
266  Chapter 4. 
267  Chapter 3 § 4 above. 
268  Chapter 3. 
269  Chapter 4. 
270  Above 47-48. 
271  Above. 
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• where an employee is tested positive, such person may be afforded an opportunity to 
explain the outcome of the test;272 
• an employee who is tested positive must be referred for further expert examination to 
establish if such employee is suffering from drug-dependency which is an illness in 
terms of item 10(3) of the Code. The employer must take reasonable steps of 
counselling and rehabilitation because drug-dependency is a form of incapacity;273 
• the LRA must put in place the prescriptive procedures to be followed by the employer 
for on-site drug screening;274 
• employers may adopt saliva drug test program for random testing, pre-employment 
testing, reasonable suspicion testing, pre-access testing, mandatory testing and post-
accident testing. Saliva testing is reasonably related to its purpose of ensuring safety 
because it detects current drug impairment, as opposed to urine test which detects past 
impairment. Saliva testing detects cannabis within four hours after consumption, which 
is no doubt, the likelihood of impairment at the time of the test. Put differently, it is 
reasonable to declare someone impaired for using cannabis four hours prior to drug 
screening. This method strikes a fair balance between the interests of the employer to 
ensure safety by putting in place of drug policies and employees right to privacy;275 and 
• a dismissal is only substantively fair in terms of section 188(1)(b) of the LRA read with 
item 7(b)(i) of the Code, where an employee is tested positive by way of oral fluids or 
saliva drug test.276 Such constitutes a reasonable invasion of the right to privacy. 
 
The Code of Good Practice may include a separate part regulating “Workplace Drug Testing”. 
Parliament must amend or repeal (wholly or partially), certain provisions of the LRA regulating 
workplace drug testing, only to the extent of their inconsistency with the Constitution.277 In 
doing so, the abovementioned recommendations should be considered in the process of 
 
272  Above. 
273  See Chapter 2 § 4 and item 10(3) of the Code. Refer to Van Niekerk (n 25) 276 for a comprehensive discussion. 
274  Pearce (n 257) 156. 
275  Above 48-50. 
276  Above. 
277  Parliament vests power to rectify statutes through amendment or repealing. S 172(1)(a) of the Constitution 
states that “[w]hen deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court must declare that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency”. Subsection 
(b)(ii) states that the “court may make any order… to allow the competent authority [Parliament] to correct 
the defect”.  S 172 is given effect to by the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (hereinafter “the Act”). S 11 of the 
Act permit courts to repeal wholly or partially, certain provisions of the statutes to the extent of their 
inconsistency with the Constitution. 
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amendment and repealing. Other academics argue that the promulgation of legislation 
regulating workplace drug testing is a good response to strike a fair balance between the 
employer’s desire to enhance workplace safety and the employee’s rights.278 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Decriminalisation of private use of cannabis has had consequences in labour law. The balance 
between employee(s) right to privacy against employer(s) interest to ensure safety with drug 
policies has seen an upset. South African courts are silent on what constitutes a reasonable drug 
testing policy. Foreign courts provide insightful solutions to assess the test of reasonableness 
through balancing of competing interests, something which our constitutional right to fair 
labour practices acknowledges. The test is traced from Kahn-Freund, the father of labour law, 
where he states that “…labour law [is] a means to counteract the inequality of bargaining power 
between employers and employees… to maintain equilibrium between employers and 
workers”.279 Another insightful solution drawn from foreign courts is, inter alia, adopting drug 
testing policy which is rationally related to its purpose of maintaining safety. This is an 
important component of assessing reasonableness of testing policies by virtue that some testing 
methods disclose past drug impairment and not the likelihood of impairment at the time of the 
test. In my view, a reasonable workplace policy is, broadly speaking, important for workplaces 
to prevent unfair dismissals. More so, because work is fundamental in the modern day. As Van 
Niekerk puts forward, work is closely linked with one’s “self-esteem”, “status” and “worth”.280 
These terms are fundamental to the constitutional values of “human dignity” and the concept 
of “ubuntu”.281 Especially in a developing country such as South Africa, work is the only source 
of money for vast majority of the population. So, it is no doubt that loss of employment 
(especially in South Africa where there is a high level of unemployment) has a devastating 
impact on persons and their families.282 It is therefore of pivotal importance for our courts to 
construe labour statues in line with the normative values of the Constitution, to strive towards 
a transformative society and the achievement of social justice in the workplace.283                                                
 
278  Pearce (n 257) 172. 
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